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The Editors: An Arms Control Primer

ALAN BRINKLEY ON WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY • ROBERT BAZELL: INSIDE CHERNOBYL

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

Colin Powell Takes Command

by Fred Barnes



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

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FROM WASHINGTON

THE ROAD TO RIO

Around Washington it's widely believed that someone should have stuck a sock in Michael Dukakis's mouth before he said that the Monroe Doctrine has been "superseded" by the Rio Treaty. Although he later amended "superseded" to "expanded on," this is regarded as the testament of a foreign-policy naïf.

The Monroe Doctrine needs no introduction; the Rio Treaty is the founding document of the Organization of American States, pledging all member nations to respect the sovereignty of the others and to act only jointly to protect the regional security. Dukakis's remark has become shorthand for the general proposition that U.S. policy—not just in Latin America but on the larger world stage—should be based on cooperation among allies, rather than unilateral superpower prerogative. Or, to put it less flatteringly, the Dukakis Doctrine asserts that we sometimes ought to defer to other countries about how to protect our own national security, even if we think they're wrong.

Is this really so naive? You don't need to refight the war in Nicaragua to see the perils of unilateralism. Events of just the past couple of months in Honduras and Panama provide two object lessons.

If ever there was a country we thought we could just push around, it was Honduras. We've flooded it with aid, ignored human rights abuses and army drug corruption, and used it as a staging ground for the *contra* war. Then we snatch a notorious international drug tycoon from the streets of Tegucigalpa, in violation of the Honduran constitution, which forbids extradition, and the country erupts in fury. Meanwhile Panama, a country whose currency is the U.S. dollar, refuses to dislodge a dictator despite every possible American encouragement short of an invasion.

Here are six unsentimental, dry-eyed reasons to let our foreign policy be "held hostage" to the views of other nations.

First, there is the burden of history. This is a real, unavoidable burden even when it is an unfair one. It may seem irrational to us that today's efforts to rid the world of a murderous drug dealer or to liberate Panama from a thug should be judged on the basis of past U.S. initiatives in Latin America with less admirable aims. But Latin nations will always clutch their sovereignty like a security blanket and resent Yanqui interference, however nobly intended. That's why the Hondurans rioted and why Castro's Cuba and Pinochet's Chile are united in opposing our campaign against Panama. Policies based on consensus and respect for sovereignty are more likely to succeed.

Second, multilateralism is a useful reality test. Although the judgment of U.S. officials is always exquisite, of course, and cannot be compared to the views of leaders of lesser countries, these foreigners' "take" on events is sometimes interesting. They wonder, for example, why Noriega is suddenly so intolerable when we had him on the CIA payroll for two decades, and turned a blind eye to his drug dealing as long as he was helping us fight the *contra* war. They wonder how our indifference to the Honduran constitution jibes with our professed interest in promoting democracy and the rule of law in their region. These are silly questions, of course, but perhaps being forced to answer them might lead to a more consistent and principled policy.

Third, sheer geography dictates that the only foreign policy you can run on a truly unilateral basis is isolationism. If we wish to interfere in countries not on our own borders, we need the cooperation of countries on their borders. (Here, as elsewhere in designing a sensible foreign policy, Grenada is the exception that proves the rule.) You can't take on Nicaragua without the help of Honduras. The Soviet Union has ways of getting such cooperation without asking for it politely, but we try to be subtler.

Fourth, the United States is simply not prepared to bear the burden of an aggressive, unilateral foreign policy. Even Ronald Reagan has never proposed it. Instead he has run a free-lunch foreign policy, which attempts to get the benefits of aggression without paying the cost in American blood and dollars. In Nicaragua we tried to substitute cheap local help. In Panama we're using economic pressure. Neither has worked. As in economic policy, the golden age of having it both ways is coming to an end. Seeking the cooperation of other nations in our campaign to improve the world is not, as conservatives charge, a covert retreat into isolationism. It's the only practical alternative to isolationism.

Fifth, outside of Latin America, there is the question of burden sharing. We are eager for Western Europe and Japan to pay more of the cost of our mutual defense. We can't very well ask that and then refuse them a greater role in the decision-making. Some people think that a couple hundred billion dollars a year is a small price to pay for the privilege of ignoring the opinions of our allies. I cordially invite George Bush to put this proposition to a vote.

Sixth, it surely is not good for America to be seen as blithely indifferent to its treaty commitments. We make a great fuss about Soviet violations of arms control treaties. For some fussmakers, the point is that international treaties are a bad way to govern superpower behavior. The Soviets, they say, can't be trusted to obey treaties, and the hardest-core among them wouldn't blanch at the notion that the United States shouldn't care about being trusted either. But those who think that treaties do have a useful role to play in international relations must recognize that you can't pick and choose among the treaties you've committed yourself to. Every violation of one treaty undermines the authority of all the others.

The Rio Treaty, like the U.N. Charter, reflects aspiration more than achievable reality. The United States never will and never should be shackled completely to acting in unison with our weak and contentious southern neighbors. But there's a big difference between imperfectly honoring an aspiration and treating it with contempt.

There's nothing at all naive about asserting that the values implied in the Rio Treaty are a sounder basis for American foreign policy in the late 20th century than the values implied in the Monroe Doctrine. Mike, take that sock out of your mouth. □

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

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JUNKED MAIL

To the editors:

Gregg Easterbrook's article ("Junk-Mail Politics," April 25) puts me in mind of a solicitation I received three years ago from the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, promising me a Certificate of Merit if I would write my name on the enclosed form. I printed "John Hinckley" and returned it, without contribution, in their postpaid envelope. A month later there was a manila envelope for John Hinckley at my address. Inside, in Gothic script and suitable for framing, was a certificate that read, "1985 Citizen of the Year awarded to John Hinckley affirmed by a unanimous vote of the National Board of Directors in recognition of outstanding individual effort in defense of the right to keep and bear arms."

BRUCE BERGER
Aspen, Colorado

To the editors:

It was distressing to read Gregg Easterbrook's article. Like millions of others, our family gives to as many causes as we can afford, and we feel uncomfortable about others that seem equally good to which we can't contribute. Receiving nine further requests for contributions after you have given does make you feel that your money is being used for further solicitation rather than for action in the cause. What my wife and I think we'll do is send out a form letter of our own saying that we'll be happy to give ten dollars if the organization really wants it. Would they just write back to us and say so? If they do, we'll continue to send contributions. But if there is just a computer there that can't be bothered about ten dollars, or can't answer an individual request, we won't. That way we may have a bit more to give to organizations that still retain people who care about causes themselves.

MATTHEW MELKO
Dayton, Ohio

NOW, THE BAD NEWS

To the editors:

Richard Blow's article on the passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act ("Don't Look NOW," April 11) states that the CRRA, without the Danforth amendment, could have required Catholic hospitals receiving federal funds to perform or pay for abortions. In fact, nothing in the original Title IX (which was being restored by the CRRA) said anything about abortion.

The article wrongly states that NOW decided it would rather see the entire civil rights bill defeated than accept an abortion amendment. Former NOW President Eleanor Smeal stated—with total support from the women's organizations—that if the Leadership Conference decided that the CRRA could not move without an anti-abortion amendment on Title IX, then we would all prefer Title IX being separated from the bill. We actively supported the CRRA but we were unwilling to trade one set of women's rights for another—educational opportunity at the expense of our constitutional right to abortion. Suddenly the Leadership Conference started moving the bill, virtually without notice to supporting groups, and we were being told that the votes weren't there to defeat the anti-abortion amendment. We simply said to the Senate supporters of the CRRA that we wanted to have Title IX pulled from the bill if they could not defeat the amendment. For reasons unknown to us, this long-standing agreement was never kept.

Our National Board decided not to oppose the amended bill, in order to ensure restoration of the rights of minorities, the elderly, and the disabled. Shortly after the Senate bill was passed, the strategy was developed to go directly to the House floor with the Senate bill, bypassing all House committees, and thereby bypassing any efforts to eliminate the anti-abortion amendment. House members asked where we stood. And thus we said we wanted a clean bill, without amendments; otherwise, we wanted Title IX pulled. We are glad that the CRRA has passed. But it was passed by trading away a constitutional right of the women of this country. Someone had to make clear what was at stake, and that someone was NOW.

MOLLY YARD
President,
National Organization for Women, Inc.
Washington, D.C.

Richard Blow replies:

First, I actually stated that some senators were concerned that the CRRA could re-

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

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THE NEW REPUBLIC
MAY 30, 1988

A SUMMIT PRIMER

Coming to terms with Ronald Reagan's low tolerance for complexity has been a gradual process. There was no single moment when the mediocrity of his mind became suddenly, starkly apparent. Rather, it was a lot of little things. There was the 1980 election campaign, with his repeated insistence that the lower the tax rates, the higher the revenue. There was the Iranamok scandal, when he seemed genuinely unable to grasp that if the United States sells arms to a nation which in return impels the release of American hostages, that's sort of like trading arms for hostages. And then there was the Reykjavik summit in 1986, when Reagan came within a hair of agreeing to dismantle all ballistic missiles over ten years. It then became clear that the man in charge of half the world's nuclear weapons hadn't thought much about the strategic balance that keeps both superpowers from seriously contemplating their use.

Reagan will soon travel to the Soviet Union, where he and Mikhail Gorbachev will discuss, among other things, provisions of the unfinished Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) accord. Early indications are that START, though not an irremediably bad idea, suffers from some of the same misconceptions that possessed the president in Iceland. So for his benefit, and the benefit of summit watchers everywhere, we've prepared this handy list of reminders about how to avoid nuclear war.

1. *Less isn't necessarily better.* One implication of mainstream deterrence theory that escaped Reagan at Reykjavik is that the risk of nuclear war isn't proportional to the number of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it's when the superpowers have only a few nuclear warheads that one or the other is most tempted to wipe out the enemy's arsenal with a pre-emptive strike. Once the number of warheads is up in the thousands, getting them down around zero is a route fraught with peril, and is best traveled carefully. Along the way it's important to worry not just about the size of the two arsenals but also about their composition.

2. *Some nuclear weapons are good. Others are evil.* No, we're not just talking about American vs. Soviet weapons. We're talking about weapons that make nuclear war less likely vs. those that make it more likely. A couple of decades ago, back in the golden age of deterrence, all nuclear missiles were (as these things go) good. That is, they (*a*) weren't especially accurate, and (*b*) carried only one warhead. The inaccuracy meant they couldn't destroy enemy missiles in their silos, so each nation knew that launching an attack would mean its own annihilation. Having only one warhead per missile further ensured the survival of a retaliatory force; it meant that each arsenal was spread out among lots of silos, thus constituting a diffuse target.

3. *The evil weapons seem to be gaining on the good.* Around the 1970s people started building very accurate warheads and multiple-warhead missiles. Thus, today the Soviet Union has 3,000 highly accurate land-based SS-18 warheads, while all 2,300 of our land-based warheads are

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packed into 1,000 missiles. So theoretically the Russians could direct three warheads at each silo, for good measure, and then shower the rest of the nation with several thousand less accurate warheads, keeping a few thousand in reserve in case we twitched after the smoke cleared. Similarly, we have a few thousand silo-killing warheads compared with their 1,400 silos (although most of these warheads are on airplanes, and would be harder to surprise them with). Actually, things aren't as dangerous as all this sounds. After a Soviet first strike, we would still have recourse to the other two legs of our triad: 5,600 sea-based warheads and 5,100 air-based warheads. Still, there's always the remote chance that they'll stumble onto a technological breakthrough that would make another leg of the triad vulnerable. Besides, however theoretical and abstract optimal deterrence may sound, we might as well stay as close to it as possible. A fraction of a percentage point is worth worrying about when you're talking about the chances of ending the world.

4. *START won't necessarily make things better.* Proponents of the START accord note that it would make the Russians destroy half of their SS-18s. But START's critics note that, even as SS-18 warheads were dropping from 3,000 to 1,500, the number of U.S. missile silos would drop too. It isn't that this number would *have* to drop. The START guidelines are broad. Both sides would cut total warheads to 6,000 (we now have 13,000 and they have 11,000); land-based and sea-based warheads could not together exceed 4,900; and the number of "delivery systems" (land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and nuclear-armed airplanes) would fall to 1,600 (we now have 2,000 and they have 2,400). Still, under some common scenarios, we would cope with START ceilings by cutting the number of our silos by half or even more. So the ratio of SS-18 warheads to American silos probably wouldn't drop. In fact, Henry Kissinger, one of the most high-

THE ZEITGEIST CHECKLIST

BY CHARLES PAUL FREUND

This Week		Last Week	Weeks on Chart
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2.	TRUST BUT RATIFY	*	10
3.	ANOTHER LAW OF RETURN	7	14
4.	IT'S MY PARTY	2	5
5.	STICK FIGURE	6	9
6.	ROADS TO RUIN	—	1
7.	THE BAD SEED	*	4
8.	LES MISÈRABLES	—	1
9.	THE DISMAL SILENCE	*	11
10.	THE CINE OF SLOTH	—	1

1. ROOM WITH A VIEUX

Post-Reagan memoirs. Never mind the astrology, it's the confirmation of a performance-art presidency that makes Regan's book noteworthy. The reaction of the press is that Regan is a disgrace to chivalry. It's hardly a negligible matter that Reagan fooled all of the people some of the time, but there's a sympathy backlash anyway.

2. TRUST BUT RATIFY

INF. Huh? There are serious verification problems with INF? What happened to all that talk about details? What happens if it remains unratified? Will allies be able, politically, to retain U.S. missiles at this point? Or will Soviets win START concessions in return for resolving the problem? It's bizarre that such labored-over provisions turned out ambiguous.

3. ANOTHER LAW OF RETURN

Israel. Israel's effort to deport Mubarak Awad is a potential p.r. disaster. Whatever the facts, Awad appears to be the kind of Palestinian the Israelis say they'd like to deal with. If he has no following, Israeli hawks benefit from his failure. If he really is a fraud, Israel needs to make a definitive case. Otherwise, Israel may appear to be avoiding resolution.

4. IT'S MY PARTY

Deleninization. In Poland the West seems content to wait for the other boot to drop. The gee-whiz news has shifted back to the U.S.S.R., where *Glasnost* magazine staffers actually tried to organize a rival party. Gorbo—and his enemies—are rapidly approaching a point of no return; at some point, a pluralist genie may wriggle out of the bottle.

5. STICK FIGURE

Bush. Politics abhors a vacuum. If you don't build your public persona with matters of your own choice, someone will do it for you. That's just what's happening with Bush. The supreme irony is that much of the stuff that's been rolling off Reagan—Noriega and Meese, for example—is sticking to Bush. He's getting a rep in the Washington press corps as the Velcro Veep.

6. ROADS TO RUIN

The infrastructure. The closing of New York's Williamsburg Bridge has revived the falling bridges story. This has been around before, and will be again; 25 percent of all bridges reportedly need attention, and nobody's got money anymore. Similarly, many urban roads are in abysmal shape, and are likely to stay that way. It's like the natural environment story: permanent but peripheral.

7. THE BAD SEED

Drug war. The government's Zero Tolerance policy of seizing property if so much as a marijuana seed—never mind whose—is found on it is simple desperation; power as a reeling juggernaut. Why not make possession a capital offense? Where is the cultural support for this policy? In fact, the culture and its drug laws are completely out of sync, as if these laws were theocratic.

8. LES MISÈRABLES

France. Americans take two other cultures seriously: the Brits, to whom they enjoy feeling inferior, and the French, to whom they feel joylessly inferior. Thus the remarkably detailed coverage of the election, and the frustrated coverage of France's hostage deal. Because of Iranamok, we lacked the angle of harrumphing outrage we like to direct at Eurowimps. No moral ground.

9. THE DISMAL SILENCE

Post-crash. Unemployment's way down. That's good. But that could mean wage inflation. That's bad. The market's sort of steady. That's good. But that means it's boring and money may get out. That's bad. People are saving more money. That's good. But that means they're not spending it. That's bad. Does anybody have a notion of where we are now?

10. THE CINE OF SLOTH

Video cribbing. Students are avoiding reading by renting videos of assigned classics. Here was the overlooked solution to the Stanford controversy: few non-Western classics are available on video; ergo, they're inaccessible to postliterate students. By the way, video cribbing makes Cliff's Notes respectable; Cliff's follows the books.

*Item resurfaces in the Zeitgeist after at least one week's absence.

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profile START skeptics, envisions the ratio going from 3-to-1 to 4-to-1. Worse yet, Kissinger and others expect us to slash our nuclear-armed submarine force in complying with START. Since the Russians, like us, wouldn't have to get rid of any submarines devoted to attacking other subs, the sea leg of our triad would then be more vulnerable (though still not very vulnerable).

5. *START won't necessarily make things worse.* Don't let Henry Kissinger get you down. To warn that the ratio of SS-18 warheads to U.S. silos may go from 3-to-1 to 4-to-1 is like worrying that someone you're about to have a duel with is concealing a second gun. For various reasons, it would make zero sense for the Russians to use more than two or three warheads per silo in a first strike. On the other hand, even a 3-to-1 ratio isn't something you want to reflect on every night at bedtime. Ideally, START wouldn't just make things no worse; it would make them better.

6. *Things can get better under START.* That's the good news. The bad news is that most of the schemes for making them better are pricey. For example, there's the Winnebago of nuclear arms: the mobile Midgetman. This missile, still on the drawing boards, would carry its launcher with it, and thus could be fired from an infinite number of sites. The effect would be to move the ratio of Soviet warheads to U.S. launch sites toward zero. This sort of wizardry doesn't come cheap, of course—30, 40, 50 billion dollars. There's a similarly expensive solution to the submarine problem. Kissinger's fear that we'd have to get rid of lots of subs under a START agreement rests on the present rules for counting sea-based missiles: each submarine is assumed to have as many missiles, with as many warheads, as it is capable of carrying. So a Trident I, whether loaded or not, would be counted as having 192 missiles. Some defense-establishment visionaries have figured out a great way around this snag: build a whole new generation of submarines that don't carry many missiles. The price tag? Don't ask.

7. *A jillion dollars saved is a jillion dollars earned.* In theory, one of the advantages of arms control is that it stems the costly proliferation of weapons. Ideally, our nation would be run by someone who could strike bargains that did this. They would be inherently stabilizing and wouldn't leave us scrambling for new, stabilizing weapons. Since that appears not to be the case, we'll have to seek *relatively* cheap ways to stabilize things under START.

8. *Never buy a weapons system without checking the discount racks.* A relatively cheap mobile-missile system is available. The administration wants to put our several dozen MX missiles (each with ten warheads) on a train that, in a crisis, would leave the station house and head down the tracks, stopping to launch at its leisure. Another approach, which has technical advantages over this Amtrak MX and probably wouldn't cost any more, was recently proposed in TNR by Brent Scowcroft, John Deutch, and R. James Woolsey ("Come and Get Us," April 18). We would take our existing, three-warhead Minuteman IIIs, put them in portable canisters, and periodically move them around from one hole in the ground to the next. This shell game, supposedly, would cost only $10 billion to $15 billion. The bargain-basement solution to the submarine problem is cheaper: rather than build a new fleet of submarines with fewer launching tubes, just cut half the launching tubes out of existing subs. We'd have to change the START counting rules, and guard against cheating, but credible experts believe the verification is doable.

9. *Bargaining chips are perishable items.* The Strategic Defense Initiative isn't the bargaining chip it used to be, back when Reagan was riding high, back before the Office of Technology Assessment had carefully appraised the idea. But the Soviet Union still seems to fear SDI. Does that mean we should cling to it dearly? Not really. Maybe the Russians just understand that Star Wars could be destabilizing, making the future look bleaker for *both* nations. After all, if a missile defense works very effectively, it has nasty side effects somewhat like those of multiple-warhead missiles with accurate warheads; it tempts one side (us, at first, but then them, once they've erected a defense) to launch a first strike, in hopes of screening out the crippled retaliatory strike. Whatever the cause of the Soviet concern about Star Wars, the upshot is that it's not too late to cash in this bargaining chip, agreeing to a ban on deployment and most forms of testing. And it's certainly not too soon; SDI probably won't fare well in the next administration anyway. In return, we could get some of the security that a well-crafted START agreement would have possessed from the beginning. For example: deeper cuts in SS-18 warheads, cuts in Soviet submarine-attacking subs, or more farseeing restrictions that would nip future sources of anxiety in the bud. Such concrete gains are vastly preferable to the dubious security promised by the administration's tortured Star Wars scenarios.

10. *We don't desperately need a START agreement.* It is possible, through tough bargaining over the fine print and clever adaptation to START's limits, to reconcile START with greater stability at a reasonable price. And this would probably be worthwhile; a START agreement could be the way station to a second, more judicious accord ten years down the road that would unequivocally make the world safer (an accord permitting, say, 3,000 warheads apiece, with a low ratio of warheads to missiles, and to delivery systems generally—all backed up by intrusive verification). On the other hand, the START accord isn't so enticing that we should make big concessions to get it signed. Besides, there's more than a week's worth of work on it yet to be done. So if, as is widely expected, no agreement emerges from the Moscow summit, it won't be the end of the world.

LITTLE LEAP FORWARD

The week before South Korea's first-ever genuine parliamentary elections, most commentators—from the *Far Eastern Economic Review* to the opposition press in South Korea

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itself—were predicting a solid majority for President Roh Tae Woo's ruling Democratic Justice Party. As it turned out, the DJP won 125 out of the 299 seats—25 short of a majority—proving that corruption was low (or comfortingly inept) and that Koreans, pace the pundits, had no intention of turning their newfound democracy into an elected dictatorship.

Now, as if the experts had not sufficiently underestimated Koreans' enthusiasm for constitutional democracy, the fear is political deadlock. Under the South Korean constitution, set up on the American model, the president has executive powers but needs the cooperation of the assembly to pass a law—and a budget. Thanks to the opposition's majority in the assembly (the first such majority in South Korea's 40-year history), that's not going to be so easy.

Koreans, on the evidence of the polling, wanted it that way. They gave the opposition parties 66 percent of the vote, more than the combined vote for the two opposition leaders in the December election. But they also voted for compromise The most volatile member of the opposition and the man most likely to bring on political paralysis, Kim Dae Jung, saw his party's vote slump to 19 percent in April from his personal showing of 27 percent in the December presidential elections. The other Kim, Kim Young Sam, also saw his vote drop from 28 percent to 24 percent, as disillusioned voters took their revenge on the two men who split the opposition and allowed Roh to win last December. The big gainer was Kim Jong Pil (although it's not required by law, all opposition leaders in Korea are called Kim), whose more moderate and accommodationist New Democratic Party jumped from eight percent last December to 15 percent this time around. A former head of the hated Korean Central Intelligence Agency and a prime minister in the autocratic early 1970s, this third Kim is no radical. A born-again democrat (like almost every self-interested Korean with a history of public service), he has agreed to support the government as long as it acts "rationally and morally." He's set to be the power broker in the new assembly.

Korean voters have done what American—and now apparently French—voters like to do. They have installed a tough-minded executive and hedged him in with a touchy but amenable legislature. Paralysis is one way of describing this. Constitutionalism is another. Meaningful universal suffrage, dramatically won by Koreans last summer, is only half a democratic system. The other half—the more difficult—is separation of powers and the moderation of limited government. With their vote last month, Koreans constructed a government that both places a premium on stability (especially in the months before the Olympics in September) and keeps steady pressure on the government to liberalize further. The most critical areas—a free press law and legislative controls on the security agencies—now wait for the opposition in the assembly. All that's needed is for the three Kims to show the same level of democratic maturity as the voters.

Starvation Again

It's time for the world to get aroused about Ethiopia again, not with an outpouring of humanitarian generosity, as during the famine of 1984-85, but with a furious welling up of indignation at the government's refusal to allow international relief organizations to distribute aid in the rebel provinces of Eritrea and Tigre. Two to three million people may starve to death as a result.

Food is available: 250,000 tons from the United States, a first-ever 250,000 tons from the Soviet Union, and 760,000 tons from other countries. But the Ethiopian government is blocking relief agencies from transporting and distributing the food, apparently in revenge for recent severe military losses at the hands of separatist rebels. There is no strategic sense to the starvation policy. Enemy fighters will get enough food to stay alive. Innocent people will not.

American television networks, which picked up fast on superb BBC coverage in 1984-85, ought to send film crews into the disputed provinces and bring to life both the war story and the famine story. The Ethiopian government probably will refuse to let them in, but enterprising journalists can slip across the border from the Sudan. (When they are finished working in Ethiopia, they slip back to the Southern Sudan, where another civil war and another famine are under way.)

All available forms of protest—vigils, demonstrations, government protests, and U.N. resolutions—ought to be directed at the Ethiopian government and its diplomatic missions. Meanwhile, secondary protests ought to be focused on the Soviet Union and the United States. Ethiopia is a Soviet client. The Soviets have tried to improve their world image by matching the United States in emergency grain donations this year (though the U.S. supplies an additional $10 million for transport and medicine). The Soviets also have tried, unsuccessfully, to get Ethiopia's brutal dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, to abandon his Stalinist plans to collectivize agriculture. If Mikhail Gorbachev really means what he says about "new political thinking" in the world, he will threaten to withhold military assistance to Ethiopia, which the U.S. government estimates has been worth $3.8 billion over the last three years. The Eritrean rebellion began with Soviet assistance in 1962 (when Ethiopia was a U.S. ally). It's a mess Gorbachev ought to try to settle.

Americans should put pressure on their own government too. There's a Reagan-Gorbachev summit coming up, and Americans ought to demand that Reagan put the lives of two million Ethiopians near the top of his agenda.

Notebook

□ OH, SURE HE DOES: "Reagan remembers the strictures of Claude-Frederic Bastiat, learned long ago at Eureka College, well enough to say there is nothing inherently wrong

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with a trade deficit." —Evans and Novak, *Washington Post*, May 4

□ CHARISMA WATCH:

"He [Dukakis] was also described as a charismatic personality . . ." —Hendrik Hertzberg, TNR, May 16, page 19

"Still, there are some limits: no one has yet said that either George Bush or Mike Dukakis is charismatic." —Martin Peretz, same issue, page 43

(thanks to David Dawson, Indianapolis, Indiana, Kenneth B. Marcus, New York, New York, etc. etc. etc.)

□ THE BRADY BUNCH:

Reagan Panel on Stock Market Crash Isn't Expected to Urge Major Changes

—*Wall Street Journal*, April 27

Reagan Group Is Likely to Back Broad Proposals on Stock Crash

—*New York Times*, same day

(thanks to J. Kennerly Davis Jr., Richmond, Virginia)

□ APRIL IN PARIS:

Leader of Right In France Backs Chirac Indirectly

—*Wall Street Journal*, May 2

Chirac gets snub from far rightist

—*Boston Globe*, same day

(thanks to David Rosenson, Brookline, Massachusetts, Frank Conte, East Boston, Massachusetts)

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

RED FOREST

Chernobyl

The workers here called it the Red forest, an ironic political joke and an accurate description. In the months after the explosion at Chernobyl hundreds of acres of pine trees surrounding the power plant reacted to the intense radiation that had showered the area by turning red and slowly dying. All of the trees have been removed now except for one surrounded by red flags. The Nazis used it to hang Soviet partisans during the war, so it is a shrine, and scientists have tried to keep it alive. Nearby that tree workers in huge machines continue to cart away radioactive topsoil. Trucks spray the roads with a latex solution to limit the radioactive dust in the air. And that one remaining tree clearly is dying.

The generating plant is immense, far larger than any American nuclear power station. It is as tall as the dome of the U.S. Capitol and many times the size. That makes it all the more amazing to see reactor No. 4, the one that exploded, encased forever in a sarcophagus of cement and lead. For more than a year the other three reactors have been running again, generating up to 1,000 megawatts each of electricity. There is still no debate about nuclear power in the Soviet Union.

Driving to the plant from Kiev we pass through lush Ukranian farmland with bustling villages and peasants working in the fields. Then we clear the military checkpoint, and suddenly the fields and the villages are empty. In the week after the accident the government evacuated everyone living within an 18-mile radius of the plant, and except for a few elderly peasants none of the 135,000 people have returned to their homes, nor are they likely to get back soon.

Even more eerie than the empty fields and villages is Pripyat, a modern city of skyscrapers built within a mile of the plant to house 50,000 people, construction workers, plant workers, and their families. Now it too is deserted. The buildings are empty. People left quickly without their possessions. Workers returned to remove and destroy everything. Tall grass splits the sidewalks. The rides in a children's amusement park stand frozen.

But even though no one lives here, there is an enormous amount of activity in the shadow of the plant. The village of Chernobyl, about a mile from the plant, resembles the staff headquarters of a large army at war. Indeed, the officials at the offices here direct a force of more than 10,000 people dressed in brown work uniforms who operate the plant and continue the massive cleanup of the surrounding area. (A sign in Ukranian over the plant says it is the V. I. Lenin electrical generating station. But since the accident Soviet officials have referred to it only by the name of the village.) Except for 500 workers who sleep in dormitories near the plant for two weeks at a time, all of the 10,000 leave the exclusion area when they are not working. They live in dormitories or villages, newly constructed outside the zone.

A Geiger counter shows that near the plant one is exposed to a radiation level a few hundred times normal background. But officials of Kombinat, the state organization formed after the accident to direct the plant and the cleanup operation, point out that after the accident the level was millions of times higher. The current levels, they say with pride, are evidence of the efficiency of the cleanup.

MY VISIT to Chernobyl as well as those of several other Western journalists is part of the unprecedented access we are enjoying in the Soviet Union during the weeks preceding the summit. But the Soviets are much more eager to show us Chernobyl than most things. Many believe that the explosion and its aftermath contributed significantly to *glasnost*, and that continuing honesty about the situation here proves that the policy remains alive.

"The accident at Chernobyl, like a teardrop, concen-

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trated all of the problems of our society," says Aleksandr Kovalenko, the director of information for Kombinat. The major cause of the disaster was indeed the lax and irresponsible attitude toward work that pervades almost every aspect of life in the Soviet Union. In the early morning of April 26, 1986, technicians in the control room of reactor No. 4 had been assigned to carry out a test. In order to finish the test on time, to avoid working a few extra hours, they switched off an astounding number of safety devices. The result was that the reactor exploded, caught fire, and spewed out half its enormous contents of radioactive material, first in the surrounding area and finally in a cloud that encircled the globe.

AT FIRST both local and central government acted with the usual impulse: deny and cover up. But as the radiation alarms sounded in Sweden and much of the world panicked, the government decided to try something different: openness and honesty. Many Soviets believe that this could not have happened if Gorbachev had not come to power. Whether that is true, Western observers think that the ultimate response did a great deal to facilitate continuing *glasnost*. James Oberg, author of the book *Uncovering Soviet Disasters*, says that "when the government did tell the truth the result was not the Soviet-bashing it had expected, but a genuine worldwide sympathy for what the Soviet people were suffering. And this encouraged more truth."

Just as the behavior in the control room showed the worst and quite common aspects of Soviet workmanship, the efforts to contain the disaster and to clean up after it have demonstrated what this society can accomplish with a single-minded purpose. It is difficult to imagine that if the United States suffered a similar disaster so much could be accomplished in such a short time. Soviet television and newspapers have portrayed the people who came to Chernobyl as heroic and selfless. It is true that constructing the sarcophagus, tunneling beneath the reactor to stop a meltdown, and carting away massive amounts of radioactive soil carried great risk. But most of the workers were attracted by double pay, accumulation of double time to retirement, and benefits usually reserved for Party hacks or others with connections. These include vacations on the Black Sea, decent food, and admission of their children to the right summer camps where they have the chance to make acquaintances that might lead to upward mobility.

Food is an obsession of almost everyone in the Soviet Union. No one is starving, but because of constant shortages and indifferent service food is usually dreadful. The two best meals I've had during two weeks in the Soviet Union were in a dining room in the generating plant and at a workers' mess hall just outside the exclusion zone. It is clear the Soviet government knows what is needed to motivate its workers. The question is whether such motivation can ever be extended to wheat production, computer development, or distribution of consumer goods.

Another sign of the importance of Chernobyl as a symbol was the recent article in *Pravda* criticizing Kombinat. It charged that there are still instances of drunkenness among the workers and cases of people getting the best jobs through cronyism. It would be astounding to find any project in the Soviet Union lacking those problems, let alone one of the largest undertakings in its history. Officials in both Moscow and Kiev told me that one reason for the article is that the Ukraine continues to be a center of resistance to Gorbachev's policies, and undermining the credibility of Ukranian officials is useful. Even so, the message is clear: the response to the disaster is supposed to represent a turning point in the Soviet way of doing things.

The invitation to U.S. and European scientists to attend a conference in Kiev from May 11 to 13 on the health effects of the disaster was another example of the Soviet effort to tell all about Chernobyl. The explosion exposed more people to radiation than any incident since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The exposures ranged from slight to massive. Except for the 31 who have died, so far there is little to tell. Soviet officials now acknowledge that they advised abortions for all women who were seven months pregnant or less and who were exposed to radiation. The officials say no one was forced, but it appears that most took the advice, so there have been no reported birth defects. Most other problems such as cancer would usually take longer to appear.

The Western scientists are eager to make sure that the health of all those who were exposed is checked thoroughly for many years and that the Soviets make the best possible effort to determine how much radiation each person absorbed. The Soviets say they are doing all this. Such information will be invaluable. Chernobyl was by far the worst peacetime nuclear accident, but no one believes it will be the last.

ROBERT BAZELL

Robert Bazell is the science correspondent for NBC News.

POSTCARD BROOKLINE

LOCAL HERO

THE POLICE CHIEF has already warned the finance committee about the costs associated with having a native son on the national ballot. The city magazine has asked the town whether provisions have been made for crowd control. Yes, it's true: my own town is about to take its place on the national stage as home of a presidential candidate. I expect the attention to be intense, because Michael Dukakis and Brookline, like Jimmy Carter and Plains, are thoroughly intertwined. He is the native son who never really left. He not only hails from this town, but has—with a few years off for Swarthmore, Korea, and hitchhiking—lived here his whole life. There's no governor's mansion in Massachusetts (an anti-British holdover),

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so the governor is a neighbor in the duplex on Perry Street, an occasional late-night shopper at the Harvard Street Stop and Shop, a fellow D-train commuter. His first elected office was Town Meeting member; his first power base, the Democratic Town Committee.

Personally, I'm wondering less about the effect of the press corps on the local economy, or of tourists on already long restaurant lines, than about the strange process through which our municipal persona will be determined. Clearly Brookline can't be cast as a sleepy Southern crossroads or a small town in the heartland. But what label *will* stick to this Boston suburb of 58,000 people? It's no small matter for the candidate himself; press and voters will search our history and demographics for clues about the man Brooklinites call Michael.

I wouldn't presume to make the decision. I will leave Brookline's essential identity for network news producers to ponder. But in the interest of being a responsible extra, I here present a few options.

1. *Toney suburb.*

This is an early favorite. John McLaughlin has already tried to cast the town as a "silver spoon"-type place, thus denying Dukakis the populist advantage against Bush. There's some truth in the charge. The town began life as part of Boston but got out in the early 1700s and has repeatedly fought off annexation attempts. It has big estates, the first country club in the United States (site of the U.S. Open this summer), and exclusive private schools. And even the *public* high school has a girls' crew team.

Reality check: some 40 percent of the town's 23,000 housing units are subsidized, including 8,300 rent-controlled apartments and 1,500 public housing units. Twenty-eight percent of the public school students are minorities (13 percent Asian, 15 percent black or Hispanic). Median income is $19,000—although that figure is diluted by the many college students for whom the town is a dorm-room community.

2. *New England Village.*

William Dawes rode through Brookline on his leg of the Paul Revere mission. We call our executive branch the Board of Selectmen and set our budgets and bylaws through a kind of citizen legislature, the Town Meeting: 15 town meeting members elected from each of 16 precincts. We reason together in the high school auditorium. (And occasionally we take up global issues. The Town Meeting has, for example, made the town a nuclear-free zone and a Nicaraguan sister city.)

Reality check: true, the Town Meeting dates to the Puritan forebears, but 20th-century Brookline government reflects Progressive era ideals too. Town Meeting members and selectmen are supposed to be citizen/officials, not politicians. Selectmen are paid minimally, Town Meeting members not at all. The town is run, day-to-day, by a town administrator, who earns $80,000 and gets a house. This Yankee progressivism has molded Dukakis's political character. Brooklinites have always distrusted big-city bosses, and Dukakis has always been the "integrity" candidate. The Town Meeting has traditionally valued decorum and scorned emotion and demagoguery. Hence, perhaps, the Dukakis reserve. Town Meeting debate is ordered. A moderator sets aside a limited time for debate. Consensus, it is trusted, will emerge. Granted, in recent years this good-government approach has been fractured by such issues as rent control, and the resulting factionalism may tempt the press to miscast Dukakis as the product of interest-group politics. But the truth is that Dukakis, the issue-oriented consensus-builder, came of age when politics in Brookline was rational and genteel.

3. *Rung on the ladder of upward mobility.*

This image is most in keeping with the immigrant saga Dukakis has adopted for campaign use. And it's true that, from the '30s on, Brookline, once a Yankee enclave, offered a foothold in the middle class for newcomers, particularly Jews. Asian Americans, the fastest-growing ethnic group in town, are now following in Jewish footsteps. The town's two- and three-family houses offer a boost for upwardly mobile homeowners who want to double as landlords (Dukakis's parents, for example). The three-family neighborhoods were once predominantly Irish and now offer an American-dream pastiche of Asians, Hispanics, and a few blacks. The state has designated the town a "gateway city" for new immigrants.

Reality check: Historically, Brookline was unfriendly to immigration. Prescott Hall, national director of the Immigration Restriction League (active in the 1910s and early '20s) was also head of the Brookline Civic Improvement Association. He not only sought restrictive quotas on immigration (such as those adopted in 1924) but campaigned locally against three-family houses, fearing they would bring rabble. Immigrants who made it in town were not given to celebrating their ethnic identity. ("Yankee Jews" is a term sometimes heard.) Perhaps this explains Dukakis's reported unease in real ethnic settings, such as Astoria, the Greek neighborhood in Queens.

In this buffet of available Brookline images, the upper-crust option must be considered a favorite. Come June, the U.S. Open will reinforce it. But also in June is the annual Town Meeting, so the New England Village option may be used as well. There's bound to be a new chapter in the debate about whether the meeting should open with the pledge of allegiance, a dispute that pits upper-middle-class civil libertarians against a coalition of blue-collar townies and taxpayer-association types. (Proponents of the pledge have raised the issue in the expectation that it will, as usual, be defeated, thus embarrassing Dukakis, who is too liberal for their taste.) I, for one, am resigned to the likelihood that the parallel realities of my town—city and suburb, diversity and intolerance, country club and kosher deli—will get lost in the shuffle.

HOWARD HUSOCK

Howard Husock is director of the case-study program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and a Brookline Town Meeting member, Precinct Six.

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The general at the NSC.

POWELL IN COMMAND

ONE MORNING last November Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger showed up at the office of Howard Baker, the White House chief of staff, with an unexpected announcement. He was quitting for personal reasons, mainly his wife's poor health. Baker immediately took Weinberger down the hall to the Oval Office. President Reagan accepted Weinberger's decision to resign, and the three fell into a discussion of who should be named secretary of defense. Weinberger favored his deputy, William Taft IV. Baker pushed Frank Carlucci, the national security adviser, and he prevailed.

Then they took up the vacancy they'd just created, national security adviser, the person who guides the National Security Council staff and gives the president a 30-minute intelligence briefing each morning. The first name mentioned was Gen. Colin Powell, who'd been deputy national security adviser for ten months. "I think that's a great idea," gushed Reagan. "Nobody else was considered," says Baker.

In his lame duck days Reagan has stumbled onto the kind of national security adviser he always needed but never had, a tough guy without an independent streak. The post is Reagan's Bermuda Triangle, swallowing up more appointees than any other job in his administration. President Nixon had one national security adviser, Ford two, Carter one. Powell is Reagan's seventh, following Richard Allen, William Clark, Robert McFarlane, John Poindexter, Alton Keel (acting), and Carlucci. With the possible exception of Carlucci, none did the job according to Reagan's professed specifications.

The idea when Reagan took office was to downgrade the adviser's role by installing someone who would coordinate, rather than formulate, foreign and defense policy. But the job was downgraded too much, and Reagan's security advisers lacked the clout to resolve policy disagreements, notably between Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz. This caused policy paralysis (arms control, Middle East, etc.), and one byproduct was an NSC staff that carried out policies of its own, selling arms to Iran and steering private aid to the *contras*. This was worse than having another high-handed policy heavyweight like Henry Kissinger in the job. What Reagan needed was a national security adviser strong enough to settle policy disputes but without a personal agenda.

That's Powell, 51, a three-star general who didn't go to West Point but has one of the most glittering résumés in the Army. Powell was chosen more for his organizational skill than for his strong foreign policy views. Yet he is in a better position to shape policy than any of Reagan's national security advisers. In earlier days both Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey had private pipelines to the president. Along with Shultz, they dominated national security policy. Now only Shultz is left, which means the national security adviser has a larger role.

So what are Powell's views? That's not entirely clear. "I am not an ideologue," he says. Asked if he considers himself a conservative, Powell said, "Oh, I never talk politics." He seems to be something of a hard-liner, though he doesn't always sound that way in public. Dan Howard, the assistant defense secretary for public affairs, calls Powell a "Scoop Jackson Democrat, a hard-headed conservative with a strong element of pragmatism." This, says Howard, is "common to military officers." Powell is fervently pro-*contra*. He believes that a steady flow of military aid to anti-Communist rebels would be as successful in Nicaragua as it was in Afghanistan. But he concedes that aid to the *contras* probably won't be resumed. "We simply have failed to convince the American people," he said.

In Washington the conventional wisdom on Powell comes in two parts. The first is that he's a facilitator, not an innovator or a conceptualizer. This is true. "I'm principally a broker," says Powell. "I have strong views on things, but my job is to make sure the president gets the best information available to make an informed decision. I am not here for the purpose of lining up against Shultz or against Carlucci or against [CIA Director William] Webster." The second is that he's a doormat, allowing Shultz to control decision-making in Kissinger-like fashion. This is not true.

Powell sided with the Pentagon to thwart the ambitious plans of Shultz and Elliott Abrams, the assistant secretary of state for Latin America, to drive Gen. Manuel Noriega out of Panama. From the start, he figured it would be extraordinarily difficult to oust Noriega. "He has proved to be very persistent," Powell said on the CBS show "Nightwatch" in April. "I always thought he would be." After economic sanctions were imposed, Powell privately disputed claims that Noriega would be gone in a week. "Ten days from now, he'll still be there," he told an aide. And Powell never insisted that the goal must be Noriega's departure from Panama. That was unrealistic, he figured.

Every time Shultz came up with a new plan, Powell joined Carlucci and Richard Armitage, an assistant defense secretary, in opposing it. He went against the idea of sending two combat brigades to Panama, or of kidnapping Noriega, or of installing deposed President Eric Arturo Delvalle in the Canal Zone as head of a government in exile, or of setting up a TV station to broadcast Delvalle speeches to Panama. On all these proposals, Reagan was ambivalent. Powell was subtle. He didn't stormily announce his opposition. Instead he convened a National Security Council meeting. "The minute Shultz's views were put on the table in an open NSC meeting, they were knocked down by everybody," says a senior White House official. Having talked to Carlucci, Howard Baker, Treasury Secretary James Baker, and others, Powell knew this would happen. And that Reagan would be swayed.

When a draft of Reagan's pre-summit speech in Springfield, Massachusetts, was circulated in April, Powell went with the hard-liners and against Shultz. The issue was language raising doubts about Soviet intentions in Afghanistan. The State Department wanted the language ex-

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cised. Powell kept it in. Reagan declared in the speech that the Soviets "still hope to prop up their discredited, doomed puppet regime, and they still seek to pose a threat to neighboring Pakistan, to whom we have a long-standing commitment." When Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev learned of the speech, he was furious and complained when Shultz visited him in Moscow a few days later.

Two weeks after that, Reagan gave another speech on Soviet-American relations. Reagan applauded human rights improvements in the Soviet Union and conceded that the "United States has human rights problems of its own." He listed unemployment, homelessness, and racial intolerance. This passage was the brainstorm of Tom Griscom, the White House communications director. He went to Powell's house at Fort Myer, Virginia, on a Saturday morning to discuss the new language. Powell endorsed the notion that this will now allow Reagan to tell Gorbachev at the Moscow summit May 29 to June 3, "Look, we're up front about our human right problems and dealing with them. You should do the same."

POWELL OFTEN ACTS as a coolant. He and Carlucci have managed to cool, though only slightly, Reagan's passion for Star Wars, the space-based defense against missiles. "They had to walk the president back from the edge of the impractical," says a senior official. In "a lot of small conversations," they persuaded Reagan that an impenetrable shield won't be ready soon and that he should plan to deploy Star Wars in stages, the first one land-based. Weinberger had opposed this. With Weinberger gone, "the president has changed the way he thinks about" Star Wars, the official said.

It also fell to Powell to signal Shultz that there would be no new arms control agreement to sign in Moscow. Shultz was too eager for a treaty reducing strategic nuclear weapons, Powell and others concluded. Shultz was willing to give the Soviets leeway on matters such as how to verify sea-launched cruise missiles. Powell and Carlucci balked at this. And on May 4 Powell delivered a rebuke to officials, such as Shultz adviser Paul Nitze, who favor negotiated limits on Star Wars research. To make sure Powell's point was understood, reporters knowledgeable in the details of arms control were invited to hear his speech at the White House. He said flatly that the administration won't accept any "cute way of listing permitted and prohibited" research on Star Wars.

Powell has been willing to cool his own emotions. As strongly as he backed the *contras*, he pushed for paring down the aid package—only $3.5 million of military aid, for instance—that Reagan proposed in February. "He was the driver," says a White House official. "He was the one everyone looked to." Shultz wanted a bigger package of military aid, while some members of Congress said only non-military aid should be sought. Powell bucked Shultz, but the bill lost anyway. A few weeks earlier, he'd been dispatched to Central America to persuade the presidents of Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala to accuse the Sandinistas of grossly violating the peace accord. They wouldn't.

Even before becoming national security adviser, Powell was an amazing success story. He grew up in Harlem and South Bronx, the son of Jamaican immigrants. His parents, neither of whom finished high school, worked in the garment district. The family was extremely close. "There was something of a tradition of hard work being the way to succeed," says Powell. "And there was simply an expectation that existed in the family—you were supposed to do better. And it was a bloody disappointment to the family if you didn't."

Powell has a Reaganesque quality: an average student with leadership skills. He got C's in high school and quickly abandoned hope of transferring to Bronx High School of Science. At City College he majored in geology because it was easy. He excelled in ROTC. "We had a drill hall and there was summer camp and I was good at it," Powell told Jeremiah O'Leary of the *Washington Times*. In 1958 he graduated and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army.

He hasn't read any of the scholarly explanations of why West Indian immigrants have done better than other blacks, but he has ideas on the subject. Powell credits tightly knit families, for one thing. He says there "was also something of a tradition of a British education" among immigrants from Jamaica. And "Jamaicans and other West Indians were never oppressed to the extent that Southern blacks were," Powell says. "Southern blacks were raised believing that they were inferior. . . . West Indians did not arrive in the United States thinking that way and, for the most part, they lived in the North, where it was different."

When Powell mentions "the struggle," as he did in a speech last January, he's one of the few Reaganites who's referring to the civil rights crusade, not the struggle for more *contra* aid or less government. He's also the only Reagan White House aide I've heard use the term "institutional racism." He says it ruined the careers of black officers before his time who were given "dead-end assignments." He was "helped by the sacrifices of a lot of great guys who went before me, who led the charge, but did not benefit from the results of that work." Powell says he has encountered discrimination, but not much. When he returned from his first tour in Vietnam, he was refused service at a hamburger joint in Columbus, Georgia. And he remembers Army posts where blacks had their own officers' club "way out in the backside."

In 1972 Powell was named a White House Fellow and assigned to work at the Office of Management and Budget. As luck would have it, Weinberger was OMB director and Carlucci his deputy. They were impressed. "He was absolutely tops," says Weinberger. During the Carter administration, Powell worked for Defense Secretary Harold Brown, and he was assigned to escort Weinberger to the Pentagon during the transition in 1980. Weinberger remembered him, and so did Carlucci, who hired him as a military aide. After two years as an infantry commander, Weinberger brought him back as his own military aide.

In that job he won a reputation for scrupulous fairness

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and for making sure all senior officials got their say. He clashed with officials like Richard Perle, Weinberger's guru on nuclear arms, who wanted special access to Weinberger. "He was the real secretary of defense," says Michael Pillsbury, a former assistant secretary. "All paper, in or out, went through Colin. All meetings of substance Colin had to attend, or there was no meeting."

Powell returned to a troop command in 1986, only to be summoned to Washington in January 1987. Carlucci wanted him as his NSC deputy, but Powell refused. When Carlucci got Reagan to call, he relented. Carlucci took Powell with him to the daily sessions with Reagan, and the president and Powell hit it off. "He shows the president all the proper respect, but without the anxious, effusive deference one frequently sees in military officers," says Howard, the Pentagon official.

As security adviser, Powell lobbied for a White House policy memorandum that barred, post-Iranamok, administration officials from drumming up private aid for the *contras*. He and Carlucci reorganized the NSC, bringing in a strict chain of command to prevent another Ollie North. The NSC also got a legal officer. Once he succeeded Carlucci, Powell took on a more public role, though he complains about the weekly ritual of talking to magazine reporters. "Why do I have to talk to these people every week?" he asked Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman. "All they ever want to know is who did what to whom. They never ask about substance." Fitzwater answered, "Consider it stroking."

On TV Powell is calm and forceful, but not magnetic. Carlucci disliked television appearances, but Powell is willing. He did the "MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour" a year ago. "But his big kickoff was the summit here last December," says Liz Murphy, a White House press official. "I had him doing everything." Since then he's done regular TV duty. The only interviewer to ruffle him was Charlie Rose of "Nightwatch," who asked a poignant question about his parents, both deceased. Powell could barely answer. He looked as if he might burst into tears. He didn't. "Well, Mom, Pop, you brought us up right," he said. "All of us. I hope you're happy. I hope you're proud of what we do."

It's safe to say Powell is the most powerful black in the administration. Samuel Pierce, the secretary of housing and urban development, affects only housing programs. But is Powell the most powerful black in America? I'd say yes, for now at least. (Powell wants to return to a military assignment commanding troops next January.) Jesse Jackson and Representative William Gray, chairman of the House Budget Committee, are the only competition. Neither is the arbiter of American foreign policy.

And he may have a second shot at power. Carlucci, among others, says he should one day be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the meantime, Reagan is lucky to have him. Powell's accession to national security adviser is another example of the irony of Reagan's foreign policy. Reagan does best when he's not really trying. His biggest triumphs are in arms control, to which he'd always been indifferent, and human rights, which hasn't been an overriding concern to him. Now there's Powell. Reagan simply took the guy who was closest at hand, a fellow he liked. He didn't take the time to look for the perfect national security adviser, but that's what he got.

FRED BARNES

The truth at last.

SPEAKES AND IRANAMOK

THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL has proved such an intractable puzzle that most Americans long ago despaired of ever putting together the missing pieces. But thanks to Larry Speakes's confession that, as White House spokesman, he fabricated quotes for President Reagan, it's now obvious how the scandal came about—and how Reagan allowed himself to be drawn into this sordid affair.

August 8, 1985. Adm. John Poindexter and Col. Oliver North stood outside the Oval Office, talking animatedly with Larry Speakes. "Come on, Larry," Poindexter pleaded. "The president's got to make a decision."

"I don't know, he's awfully busy," Speakes replied. "He's cramming for tomorrow's press conference."

"You can at least ask him," Ollie said.

Speakes reluctantly entered the office. Inside President Reagan lay sound asleep, his head resting on the mound of note cards his press staff had prepared the night before. Speakes waited almost ten minutes, but the president continued sleeping. Not wishing to awaken or embarrass the president, Speakes slipped out the door.

"Well, what did he say?" the admiral eagerly inquired.

"He said to go ahead," Speakes answered.

"And so he understands the nature of our mission?"

"Yes," Speakes continued. "President Reagan said—and I'm quoting here—'Let's trade arms for hostages. Do anything you can—bake the Ayatollah a cake if you have to—but get those hostages back.' "

Poindexter and North, both ecstatic, thanked him. Speakes called to them as they walked back to their offices: "He also says to try to get the Israelis involved."

January 7, 1986. Poindexter and North stood outside the Oval Office, where they had cornered Speakes. "Can't you guys go ahead anyway?" Speakes asked. "It's just a simple change in plans."

"We need the president's permission," the admiral said.

"But he's getting ready for a photo opportunity."

"We don't act without his say so," North insisted.

Speakes reluctantly entered the president's office, where he found the commander in chief sleeping at his desk, clutching a small, black comb, his head resting on a hand mirror. Speakes waited ten minutes and then left.

"Well?" Poindexter asked.

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"He said it's OK."

"What exactly did he say?" Ollie said, his tone indicating distrust.

Speakes spoke authoritatively. "President Reagan said, and I quote: 'I think it's a neat idea to take profits from the arms sales and send them to the *contras*.' "

They thanked him, and as Poindexter and Ollie walked away, Speakes added, "The president says to use traveler's checks—that way, if you lose the money, you can get it back."

Later on, when details of the Iran-*contra* affair were reported by the media, Reagan denied knowing anything about it. First he claimed Israel had acted on its own initiative. At another press conference he declared: "We did not—repeat, did not—trade weapons or anything for hostages." And later he claimed, "I had no knowledge whatsoever of the *contra* diversion until Ed Meese briefed me on it."

No one thought to ask Larry Speakes if he knew anything about it, and, as was the practice of the White House staff, he volunteered no information. Reagan's top aides simply thought the president's memory was slipping. "I don't remember" was his most common answer to their questions regarding the scandal. So when they told him what really happened—that is, what they thought had happened—Reagan manfully accepted responsibility for the entire affair.

"A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions tell me that is true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not," he confessed to millions of Americans in a humiliating television address. "I told the Tower board I didn't know about any diversion of funds to the *contras*. But as president, I cannot escape responsibility."

Many people, claiming the president should have kept a tighter rein on his staff, believe Reagan is to blame for the entire scandal. But in my opinion, he was an innocent victim of fabricated quotes—a problem that has plagued Reagan throughout his political career.

For example, in the early 1960s someone went around telling reporters that Reagan advocated a *voluntary* Social Security system. When *New York Times* reporters asked him about this during the 1980 campaign, the flabbergasted Reagan replied, "I never suggested that Social Security should be voluntary."

And later someone apparently told reporters that the president said nuclear missiles could be recalled after they were launched from our submarines. When Walter Mondale quizzed him about this in the 1984 debates, Reagan exclaimed, "I never, ever conceived of such a thing."

Throughout his long career, Reagan has survived the many crises created by fabricated quotes. But his biggest political surprise is yet to come.

November 5, 1986. Poindexter and North argued vehemently with Speakes outside the Oval Office. "Either you talk to the president or we talk to the press," Poindexter threatened.

"But I can't disturb him on his day off."

"Do it now," Ollie demanded. "This is going to get hot, and I'm not putting my neck in a noose for anybody."

Speakes was getting tired of being pushed around by these fanatical bureaucrats, but he knew from past experience that they wouldn't leave unless they got what they wanted.

Speakes entered the Oval Office. The president lay sleeping on a couch, holding a book, *Improving Your Memory in Three Easy Steps*, his finger marking the place, page two, where he had left off reading. Rather than waiting around the usual ten minutes, Speakes immediately left.

"That was quick," said the surprised Poindexter.

"The president's a very decisive man," Speakes replied. "He said it's OK."

"What exactly did he say?" Ollie wanted to know.

Speakes, who had grown tired of North's suspicions, replied defensively. "He said to tell you that if you ever get caught and sent to jail that—and I'm quoting directly here—'I, President Ronald Wilson Reagan, will personally grant you pardons, for you are acting in the best interests of our country.' "

Both Poindexter and North breathed sighs of relief.

"And one other thing, Ollie," Speakes said. "The president wants you to stand on your head in the corner for three hours today."

Ollie frowned. "Not again!"

"Do you want that pardon or not?" Speakes demanded. North responded by saluting smartly. The president's spokesman quickly turned around so Poindexter and North wouldn't see him smiling. "This job isn't all bad," Larry Speakes thought as he sauntered down the hall.

STEPHEN C. LESUEUR

Stephen C. LeSueur is a graduate teaching fellow in the economics department at the University of Utah.

Plagiarism meets diplomacy.

SUMMIT SPEAK

THE UPROAR about Larry Speakes's acknowledgment that he manufactured presidential quotations at a superpower summit is especially amusing to those of us who have been involved in preparations for summits. A key task in those preparations is the writing of communiqués or "joint statements" that purport to recount what occurred in the discussions among world leaders. These documents are written mostly or even entirely before the event, by staffers who later may or may not participate in the actual discussions. They are eventually approved for release at high levels, but the involvement of those whose words they purportedly record is generally minimal.

In the 1970s, when I was in the communiqué-drafting business for U.S.-Soviet summit meetings, we had no pre-

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cise idea what President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev would say to each other on the various topics that both sides agreed should be on the agenda. But under instruction to accentuate the positive, before each encounter we labored with our Soviet counterparts on a string of paragraphs noting accomplishments on every subject. We had the sides agreeing to improve relations, giving primary attention to reducing the danger of nuclear war, attaching great importance to a host of projects, taking note of favorable developments, welcoming agreements already reached, and confirming their intention to conclude others.

The Nixon- and Ford-era communiqués generally used collective nouns like "the sides" and "the parties" rather than implying that the leaders themselves had discussed every item on the agenda. However, as the art of the communiqué evolved, the language became ritualistic, and often the documents discussed matters that had not come up at all. The most you could say of their accuracy as historical record is that they were not inconsistent with what was or might have been said. Indeed, by including a matter in the communiqué, reference to it in the actual meetings could become superfluous. Reagan-era summit communiqués are generally produced in much the same way. But nowadays the practice is to attribute the views and attitudes recounted directly to the "leaders" or specifically to the president and the general secretary.

THE MOST RECENT summit communiqué, from the Washington summit last December, actually was in part what it purported to be: a record of agreements reached during the summit. It had the leaders issuing detailed instructions to their arms control negotiators. Obviously these instructions were not worked out by the leaders themselves, but they were the result of on-the-spot bargaining by senior experts, not canned in advance. This approach has turned out to have some disadvantages. The sides have found it impossible to agree on the precise meaning of the passages dealing with observance of the ABM Treaty.

Statesmen long ago agreed that if communiqués are not produced at least in rough draft before they meet, most of the time at their conferences will be taken up with this job. Advance drafting will thus undoubtedly remain the vogue. And so will the mild deception whereby events and statements are recorded before they take place. And some may not occur at all but will remain recorded because the parties would have been content to have them occur.

Perhaps there should be a Speakes Rule according to which no press agent may ever attribute to his master something the latter has not actually uttered or at least approved. But summit communiqués should be held to a rather less rigorous standard—or else this useful art form of diplomacy would have to be retired to the archives.

HELMUT SONNENFELDT

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, now a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, served in the National Security Council and the State Department under Presidents Nixon and Ford.

Farrakhan's still at it.

HATE STORY

IN THE MIDST of new concerns about growing racism at universities across the country, one unashamed racist is drawing enthusiastic crowds at university-sponsored events where he is spreading a message of bigotry and hate, all for a $7,500 fee. His name is Louis Farrakhan.

Farrakhan, leader of the Nation of Islam, spoke at the University of the District of Columbia in March, accompanied by the usual contingent of controversy and bow-tied, smartly dressed bodyguards. The controversy this time centered on the large fee and the roughing-up of four protesters outside the gymnasium where Farrakhan spoke, allegedly by members of the Nation of Islam. The bill ran to $15,200, with $1,000 in expenses for Farrakhan and the rest, after his fee, for security and production costs.

Lost in all the furor was what Farrakhan actually said. The *Washington Post* reported the next day, "Farrakhan gave a 2½ hour speech that included strong denunciations of drugs and promiscuity, attacks on intellectuals 'without wisdom,' and praise for Democratic presidential candidate Jesse L. Jackson." The *Post* did not report Farrakhan's anti-Semitic harangues. Farrakhan claims that the press distorts his message and takes comments out of context. Here, then, are extended excerpts from his speech entitled "Empowerment in the Black Community Through Politics and Economics" given at UDC on March 11, 1988, from a tape available from his organization, the Nation of Islam.

"And I respectfully say to my Jewish friends, please don't call me anti-Semitic. Go and study the state of Israel. The Ashkenazi Jews are European Jews who converted to Judaism. They never had any roots in Palestine. They never came from Palestine. These are Europeans who have come into Palestine and now the Falasha Jews and the Black Hebrew Israelites, they are suffering under the rule of the real anti-Semite, who is Yitzhak Shamir.

"Where are the Asiatic Jews? Where are the African Jews? Why don't they have an equal share of power in Israel? It is because the real anti-Semite is in power and he clutches the Semitic people who are of Afro, Asian, and Semitic origin, not these Yiddish and Polish speaking people."

Farrakhan accuses whites of distorting history by eliminating the significance of blacks and giving it a "Eurocentric" bias, but he is dead wrong on this one. The origins of European Jewry are in Palestine. The Jews of Palestine were expelled by the Romans in 70 A.D., and spread to North Africa and Italy (where many were Roman slaves). And Ashkenazic Jewry was formed, broadly speaking, by the movement of Jews in Italy to northern France and Germany, and later eastward, to Central and Eastern Europe. A minor point, perhaps, but important, because Farrakhan bases his anti-Semitism on the notion that Jewish people have exploited an exaggerated misery to gain power, and his anti-Zionism on the notion that

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the emigration of Jews to Palestine was not a return.

Farrakhan blamed the drug problem in the black community on an unidentified "they" who drug black people as a method of social control. "You can't be controlled by religion anymore. Politicians can't control you. Preachers can't control you. Mom and Dad can't control you, but drugs, but drugs can keep you in a stupor. And they're drugging you because they don't know what to do with you and they're afraid. They are afraid that the right voice with the right message will come along at the right time. And when the right voice with the right message at the right time reaches the right heart and the right mind, it will produce the rise of the people and this is what they fear. And this is why they must put a shroud over Farrakhan and call him an anti-Semite, a hater, a bigot, so that you will not listen to what your brother has to say."


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From these reflections on "they," Farrakhan launched directly into an attack on *Washington Post* columnist Richard Cohen:

"Can you imagine any white writer, any of you to have the unmitigated gall, the un-mit-i-gat-ed gall, to call *me*, a victim of white racism, a racist. I'm a victim of your bigotry, and now you call me a bigot.... Can you imagine Mr. Cohen today saying that anti-Semitism is retreating all over the world except, except in the black community. Can you imagine Mr. Cohen with the audacity to say that you are anti-Semitic. You have never harmed a Jew. I'm speaking about collectively; we know there are some blacks and Jews that have problems. But I'm talking about as a collective people. Now, we have not done anything to deserve this. And we know it's right.

"We've been loyal to you. We've cleaned your floors and when you asked us, 'And you do do windows, don't you?' we said, 'Yes.' We left our homes uncleaned to clean yours. We left our children unkempt to clean yours. We give you our talent. You manage us. You get the money. We get the fame and then end up on drugs with no money. You are our manager, you are our agents. How have we been against you? You run the institutions quietly behind the scenes. You pull the strings where education is concerned. You're the scriptwriters. You're the Hollywood promoters that promoted us as Little Black Sambo and [unintelligible] with the bug-eyes and Stepin Fetchit.

"What have we done to Jews in America? Talk back to me! We are not your enemy. We didn't burn you in no oven.... A black man wouldn't come to your synagogue and mark no swastika.... We are not haters of Jews. But I ask you, who taught us to hate ourselves? Who writes the textbooks that write us out of history? Who makes the movies that show us as nothing but Toms and bug-eyed dancers? We don't do this to you. It has been done to us. But why do you call *my* brothers and sisters anti-Semitic? It is because you view me as that and my people will not rise up to kill me as they have done other black leaders in the past at your insistence and this is why you say he is anti-Semitic. It's a damned lie.... You want my people to kill me."

On the tape you can hear a positive crowd reaction to these remarks. According to people who were present, the crowd, which was polite when Farrakhan discussed Islam and enthusiastic when he gave his stay-off-drugs message, became ecstatic when he blamed black problems on Jewish people.

Farrakhan has not fundamentally changed his message of a few years ago when he made his famous remarks that "Hitler was a great man" and "Judaism is a dirty religion." In fact, when Farrakhan went to the University of Pennsylvania in April he said the latter again. After a long explanation of how the "dirty religion" remark was taken out of context, he accused Jewish people of "using God's holy name as a shield for your dirty religion," according to a text of the speech published in the *Daily Pennsylvanian*, the student newspaper. He also said, referring to black people: "We didn't come on the Mayflower. We didn't come on the Nina, Pinta, or the Santa Maria. We were in the holds of ships.... Some Jews owned some of the ships that brought our fathers."

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According to the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Farrakhan received an honorarium of $10,000 for the speech.

DAVID KURAPKA

David Kurapka is an intern with the National Journalism Center.

Pro-lifers, reconceived.

FETAL DISTRACTION

THE ANTI-ABORTION movement is a failure. Whatever else it has done, it has not stopped abortions. Fifteen years after *Roe* v. *Wade*, more than a million occur each year in the United States. And there is not much hope that the movement can change this in the future. Indeed, the pro-life movement itself has become one of the biggest obstacles to effective action against abortion.

There are a number of reasons the anti-abortion movement cannot succeed. First, it is unlikely to reverse *Roe*. The slim odds of doing so are not just a matter of the Supreme Court's current makeup. The American public has made it clear that it supports the concepts of privacy on which *Roe* is based, however debatable the constitutional issue. The defeat of Judge Bork showed that much. Although the anti-abortion movement kept a low profile during the hearings, behind the scenes it went all out for him, mobilizing its rank and file to deluge Congress with pro-Bork calls and letters. It failed.

And even if *Roe* were reversed, there's no guarantee that it would lead to states banning abortions. The trend before *Roe* was toward liberalization. Why would the trend be reversed today? Besides, following the recent Canadian Supreme Court decision overturning restrictions there, abortion soon will be widely available just across our long northern border regardless of local restrictions below.

Then there is the new technology. Both pro- and anti-abortion leaders are closely watching the development of new drugs, of which RU 486 is the best known. RU 486 is a pill that tests in France have shown to be highly effective in inducing early abortions, with reportedly few side effects. The anti-abortion movement is working to prevent RU 486 from being made available in the United States. It may succeed for a while. But it seems safe to predict that if RU 486 continues to be banned, it could become as much a staple of the illicit drug traffic as cocaine or marijuana.

RU 486 and similar drugs, as they are perfected, will do more than make abortion cheap and widely available. They will do so in a way that strongly reinforces the autonomy of the woman involved. Doctors, clinics, and all the current paraphernalia of legal abortion will become increasingly optional, and abortion even more a private affair. Any scheme of public regulation would become more difficult to enforce.

All this is well known to the leaders of the anti-abortion movement. Yet they continue to hope for a legislative ban, some version of a constitutional amendment. Congress has been willing to end federal funding for abortions, but it has made it clear that it is not going to adopt any amendment prohibiting the practice. This apparent inconsistency accurately reflects most Americans' ambivalence toward abortion. Given a choice, we definitely do not like it, and are content to keep our tax money from paying for other people who get it. But at the same time, we definitely want it available for ourselves—just in case.

ANY WAY you look at it, the pro-life movement's political potential seems limited, to say the least. But its entire strategy has been misconceived from the beginning. Pro-lifers like to compare their struggle with the fight against slavery. In fact, it has more in common with prohibition. Slavery was a sectional phenomenon, confined to the South, and even there practiced only by a segment of the white population. Abortion is like alcohol abuse—it pervades our whole society. Men and women from every region, class, and ethnic group have been personally involved in it, and most of them have come to consider it a legitimate response to certain circumstances. Attempting to abolish it legally would be as futile as the ban on alcohol. From this perspective, *Roe* is a red herring, a colossal diversion. The idea that abortion can be stopped by reversing *Roe* is prohibitionist romanticism, as naive and foredoomed as that of the Anti-Saloon League.

For abortion supporters, this history may provide an occasion to gloat. But for those of us who consider abortion a social evil, it does not have to mean giving up. Rather, it is a signal to go back to the drawing board. An alternative strategy does not yet exist, but there are models for one.

Call these models persuasionist strategies, in contrast to their prohibitionist rivals. And take the campaigns against smoking and AIDS as path-breaking models. Like abortion, smoking is legal, pervasive, and widely accepted in our culture. Like abortion, it is also destructive of human life. In 1979 the federal government estimated that smoking claimed 320,000 victims annually, one-third the number killed by abortion. But unlike abortion, the incidence of smoking is declining. In 1964, when the first surgeon general's report declared it to be a health threat, 40 percent of Americans were smokers. By 1986 the rate was down to 26.5 percent. Research data suggests the decline is likely to continue.

What has happened? Smoking has been reduced by its progressive delegitimation, especially by the government; by the related educational anti-smoking campaigns; and by the persistence of these efforts over more than two decades. The educational campaigns have been negligible compared with the billions spent on cigarette advertising in the same period, but putting a government stamp on them helped by increasing their credibility. And only a long-term program had any chance of up-

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rooting such a deeply ingrained cultural habit.

A similar pattern is developing with AIDS. Recent statistics suggest that in at least one major risk group, white male homosexuals, the educational efforts aimed at slowing the spread of AIDS by changing sexual habits have been highly successful. The extent of the changes is confirmed by an accompanying sharp decline in other sexually transmitted diseases in this group. These drives have had the backing of the surgeon general and other government officials. There is every indication that over time they too will have significant effects on behavior.

The AIDS experience is significant in another respect. There were, and still are, influential voices calling stridently for government to take a strongly prohibitionist tack and attempt to force behavior changes among risk groups, especially homosexuals, through mandatory testing and more draconian measures such as quarantines. It is no coincidence that these voices both echo and overlap the anti-abortion constituency. But such prohibitionist agitation has thus far been decisively set aside in favor of persuasionist tactics, and the evidence suggests they are paying off.

I BELIEVE a strategy similar to these could be developed to deal with abortion, one that not only could reduce its incidence substantially, but could do so with much less of the social polarization that now surrounds the issue. Such a strategy would include all three elements of the anti-AIDS and anti-smoking campaigns: delegitimizing abortion as the major response to problem pregnancies; educating the public, especially women at risk, about alternatives and sources of support; and sustaining these efforts for a generation.

This delegitimation of abortion has nothing to do with attempts to outlaw it, any more than the anti-smoking campaigns have sought to outlaw tobacco. The issue is not whether women theoretically "should" be the ones making abortion decisions. As a matter of fact they are, and in the future, with RU 486 or the equivalent, their decision-making capacity is likely to increase. Faced with this reality, the only practical way to decrease abortion is to influence the decisions they make. The result could, for instance, take the form of a congressional finding that the policy of the United States is to discourage abortion. It could include directives to agencies that would educate Americans to stop resorting to abortion, and provide supportive services for those who seek alternatives.

With the policy in place, the government would underwrite the ongoing educational campaigns, urging women and their partners to take responsibility for avoiding abortion, and encouraging parents and others to support those who have done so. It would make use of authoritative government figures, in the way that every cigarette pack health warning cites the surgeon general. The campaign also would need to be backed by a federal commitment to offer support and services to those seeking alternatives. This would include not only prenatal and maternal health care, but also a long-overdue revamping of adoption procedures to make adoption a real rather than a theoretical option. We are a long way from making these alternatives meaningfully available to large numbers of the women faced with the abortion decision.

A shift to persuasionist tactics has another advantage for the pro-life movement. It would put the pro-choice groups on the spot, since practically all their spokespeople have repeatedly said that they too are "against" abortion, in the sense that they don't want it to be used any more often than is absolutely "necessary." They would be expected to live up to their claim.

The *Roe* obsession runs deep, and its stalemate continues. Furthermore, most of the existing anti-abortion movement—the Catholic bishops excepted—has been absorbed into the religious right. As the Reagan era ends, it may remain the strongest redoubt of reaction. Its leaders are no longer satisfied simply to resist abortion. Their movement is rapidly becoming the vehicle for a mixed bag of zealots seeking vengeance for a list of putative wrongs that includes much of the basis of 20th-century culture. In the meantime, the culture of abortion becomes ever more deeply woven into the fabric of American society. This is the bitterly ironic monument of the anti-abortion crusade. Without a shift of tactics, the movement has little to look forward to but more failure, and ignoble failure at that.

CHARLES FAGER

Charles Fager is a mail-handler in Northern Virginia.

A capitalist cure for Israel.

PROFITS OF PEACE

WHEN THE spiritual leader of the Gaza uprisings was asked on Israeli television what his major grievances were, he quickly answered: taxes and working conditions. After the recent spate of car fire-bombings by Arabs, the Arab mayor and merchants of Kalkilyia (a hotbed of radical Arab nationalism) went on Israeli TV. Despite death threats from extremists, they condemned the murder of Jewish settlers, not out of sympathy, but because it was bad for business. The Jewish settlers had stopped shopping in their market.

Arabs of all walks of life are sending a message that everyone is ignoring. A major reason for their growing frustration—surely not the most important, but important enough that they keep repeating it—is the repressive economic regime Israel has imposed on them. The Israelis have done this almost unawares. Economic centralization and government interference are the rule for all Israelis.

We also fail to heed the more hopeful corollary to this message: that though good economic conditions, offering individuals choice and opportunity, could not by themselves resolve disputes about flags and boundaries, they

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

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could greatly reduce tensions and facilitate an acceptable political solution. Since even the blithest optimist does not expect a solution overnight (the Israeli government takes years to address such life-and-death problems as its collapsing hospital system, and Palestinian Arabs are not exactly united on what a desirable solution should be), there is much to be done meanwhile to improve daily relations.

ISRAELIS OVERLOOK the economic factors that aggravate the conflict because they have become so accustomed to their politicized economic system that they do not realize what it means to be exposed to it. They excuse and accept the hardships, the monopolistic practices, the bureaucratic tangles, the more than 1,000 taxes and levies as being necessary for reasons of state security, social justice, etc. For Arabs, in the face of routine economic harassments, these are cold comforts. Furthermore, most Arabs are not—unlike many Israelis—public sector employees impervious to economic constraints.

Mostly unorganized laborers and small entrepreneurs, they lack the defenses Israelis have evolved to protect themselves from the system: an old boys' network, membership in organizations that solicit tax exemptions, and privileges of all sorts. They are Arab—namely, people with little political pull. In an economy where most resources are ultimately allocated according to political access, they feel excluded and discriminated against. Thus Israel's onerous economic system further inflames the Arabs' radical nationalism and xenophobia, just as political manipulation of the economy radicalizes less advantaged Jewish groups (such as the Sephardim) and incites violent labor strife even among patriotic citizens such as El Al workers.

Israel's social and economic system has other effects on the conflict. Few experts have noticed that it was the very progress Israel brought to Arab villages—better hygiene, medical care, and advanced agricultural techniques—that decreased infant mortality, raised the standard of living, and resulted in less work on the farm. It was the much higher wages, as well as unprecedented freedom (by Arab standards) that attracted surplus Arab labor to Israel's cities and factories. There, they became a rootless and disaffected proletariat. Migration and contact with permissive Israeli society destroyed the repressive traditional ways and authoritarian leadership of Arab village life. The void left by the loosened allegiance to family and clan was filled by a feverish and romantic nationalism, and recently a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism.

Newly acquired wealth and the dynamism of Israeli society also imbued many Arabs with great aspirations and a thirst for higher learning. Under Israeli rule, eight universities were established in the West Bank where none existed before. But Israel's statist economy was hardly a place where this new class of Arab intellectuals could find employment. The students, graduates, and faculties of these institutions would learn from Israel, as well as from every other Middle Eastern state, that in a government-run economy, the best route to economic success is political power. They therefore insist on creating a political entity to provide them, as the Israeli government provides the Jews and the Egyptian government provides the Egyptians, with jobs, patronage, status, and wealth.

Thus the conflict between the Israelis and the Arabs reflects their internal economic structures. Stagnant and politically dominated economies are the crucible for political radicalization, polarization, and a despair that finds an outlet in vainglorious dreams of national honor. For peace to stick, more must be done than reach agreement on paper among politicians, especially since most regimes in the Middle East are notoriously volatile and unstable. Israel can do much to improve relations with its Arabs and those living in the West Bank and Gaza by removing the heavy hand of government that blocks economic opportunity. It should expand and strengthen the process of tearing down the walls between the two communities—which began with the "shopping invasion" of Israelis to East Jerusalem in 1967, the opening of bridges of Jordan, and the employment of West Bank Arabs in Israel.

Israelis tend to show an elitist contempt for commercial activity, often even condemning it, since it is easy to demonstrate its many imperfections and pitfalls. But it is the only sphere where Jews and Arabs have learned to interact—not in the artificial and rarified atmosphere of conferences and seminars, but in daily life and in a framework that, despite all its problems, is mutually beneficial. Instead of finding easy fault, Israelis should encourage and expand this sphere by removing discriminatory barriers and bureaucratic interference and permitting markets to function freely. It may take many painful adjustments, but it is better that Israelis and Arabs compete and resolve problems in the marketplace than on the battlefield.

DANIEL DORON

Daniel Doron is the director of the Israel Center for Social and Economic Progress, a non-partisan think tank based in Tel Aviv.

Jesse's shady friend in the sun.

THE BAHAMA CONNECTION

UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE from American law enforcement agencies, the government of the Bahamas has been making progress in the war against drug traffickers. American drug investigators say one reason is that they have found a few honest officials in the government there. Last week one of them, Attorney General Paul L. Adderly, boasted about the country's achievements in a full-page ad in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. Not prominent among the Bahamians the United States finds trustworthy is the man who has led the nation for the last

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15 years, Sir Lynden O. Pindling. Pindling's reputation has been under siege for several years. In 1984 a Royal Commission of Investigation set up by Sir Lynden himself produced damning evidence of corruption among his top aides and cronies. Two of the commission's three members concluded there was no proof the prime minister himself had accepted drug bribes. But they did determine that over six years his spending "far exceeded" his known income, and that he had banked $2.8 million worth of cash "gifts" and "loans" and $240,000 that he could not account for. The dissenting commissioner, the bishop of Barbados, said, "I find it impossible to say that the payments [to Pindling] were all non-drug-related."

Several witnesses at the long-running trial in Jacksonville of Carlos Lehder, a renegade member of the Medellín cocaine cartel, have testified under oath about bribe payments to Pindling. In London this month the House of Lords is to hear allegations that the Bahamian equivalent of the Office of Government Ethics failed to investigate discrepancies in Pindling's financial disclosure statements. A grand jury in Florida recently began to examine the latest allegations against Sir Lynden, although few investigators believe he will ever stand trial in an American court.

Pindling has faced minimal public criticism from the Reagan administration. Given the islands' proximity to Cuba and Pindling's acceptance of an important U.S. Naval intelligence station on his territory, the State Department and Pentagon are anxious not to offend. In light of the evidence, though, administration officials have been less than effusive in endorsing Pindling. However, Pindling has one eloquent and enthusiastic champion in America, a man who has ridden the anti-drug crusade even harder than President Reagan: Jesse Jackson.

JACKSON AND PINDLING have known each other since the early 1970s. Bahamian newspaper files show that by 1983 Jackson had become a noteworthy visitor to Nassau, addressing charitable functions with speeches on America's civil rights struggle. In July 1986 Jackson spoke at a banquet held in Nassau to celebrate Pindling's 33rd year in politics and 13th year as prime minister. Pindling had been taking the lead in international efforts to step up sanctions on South Africa. But Jackson's embrace of Pindling went beyond congratulation and bordered on beatification. "Tonight we honor a leader of leaders whose entrance on the world stage is just in time," Jackson intoned. "Brother Pindling, your cross is heavy but you can bear it. Sir Pindling, at a time such as this we need you as never before. Let the slings and arrows that do fly, do not let them break your spirit. They will call you everything but a child of God."

Lest his listeners not immediately catch the analogy, Jackson continued: "We need you. In an hour such as this, God has always used small nations and great men for critical hours. Jerusalem was a small place—Jesus a big man. Montgomery a small place, Dr. King a big man. The Bahamas is a small place. Sir Pindling, you're a big man."

A few days later Pindling appeared before an Operation PUSH meeting in Chicago as Jackson's honored guest, and assured his rapt listeners that the Bahamas was the "country most assisting the United States to meet and conquer the cocaine menace."

Jackson's tone was less emotional but still enthusiastic when he visited the Bahamas last June to speak at a business conference. "Let me express my real thanks and appreciation to Sir Lynden Pindling for being the leader that he is and for having been re-elected again," he told a Nassau press conference. Although the principal purpose of his visit was unrelated to local politics, Jackson made a point of visiting Pindling in his office, allowing himself to be photographed presenting the prime minister with a copy of his new book. The Bahamian press made a point of mentioning the title: *Reverend Jesse L. Jackson—Straight from the Heart.*

Bahamian opposition leaders, who watched the blossoming Jackson-Pindling friendship with dismay, say that since last winter, when Jackson's presidential campaign picked up steam, the candidate has shown little interest in the Bahamas. Because Jackson's campaign headquarters did not respond to my questions about his relationship with Pindling, it is difficult to know whether Jackson is now trying to distance himself or whether he is (understandably) too busy to attend to the renewed public relations problems of his benighted friend.

Jackson partisans suggest that when he praised Pindling so highly, he may not have known about the allegations of corruption, although they were well publicized in the American media. Indeed, it was an "NBC Nightly News" report that forced Pindling to establish his royal inquiry in the first place. In any case, Jackson supporters stress, Pindling has yet to be indicted or convicted of any crime. This, of course, is the same argument used by the defenders of Edwin Meese, the unindicted and unconvicted U.S. attorney general, whose ethical standards Jackson has not hesitated to attack.

It will be interesting to see if Jackson joins Michael Dukakis (and, earlier, Bob Dole) in aggressively challenging George Bush about his knowledge of drug trafficking by that other hemispheric paragon, Gen. Manuel Noriega of Panama. Bush's critics accuse him of learning about Noriega's drug dealing years ago and either not paying attention or consciously turning a blind eye. If lack of interest in secret intelligence about Noriega's perfidy raises questions about Bush's stewardship of drug-enforcement efforts, then Jackson's praise of Pindling in the face of evidence of drug-related corruption should raise similar questions if President Dukakis someday appoints him U.S. drug czar.

In an election year when boredom is expected to be a dominant theme, the question of the candidates' real or presumed contacts with drug-dealing tyrants abroad may well enliven the proceedings. With Jackson leading the way, the candidates seem anxious to subject each other to the political equivalent of urinalysis. Jackson may now learn that drug tests are colorblind.

MARK HOSENBALL

Mark Hosenball is a Washington reporter for the *Sunday Times* of London.

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STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

Hidden Talent

Why—*why*—have they been keeping Nanni Moretti from us? This Italian filmmaker (born 1953) has written and directed five features, in all of which he played leading roles; but almost the only Americans who know of his existence are those who have read such a book as Peter Bondanella's *Italian Cinema* (1983). Now Moretti gets his first theatrical release in this country with *The Mass Is Ended*, and it's clear that we have been deprived.

The Mass Is Ended
(Sacis)

Moretti is tall, lean, slightly hoarse, appealing without any prettiness or aggressive charm. The silliest remark I've read about him is that he is the Woody Allen of Italy. Not only is there no resemblance to Allen in persona or looks, Moretti is a genuine actor of considerable range, not a stand-up comic who has trained himself to stay away from shtick. And Moretti's screenplay is more soundly integrated than any Allen screenplay I know.

After this loud preamble, there's an impulse to caution the reader that *The Mass Is Ended* is not an earth-shaking film, just a lovely, humane comedy-drama, somewhat in the vein of what Luigi Comencini and Mario Monicelli were doing in the 1950s and '60s. But entertaining though it is, it's more than that. When you first see the paintings of Chardin, you think they are deft and pleasant and warm; then you keep thinking about them.

Moretti plays a priest, but we don't know that immediately. We first see him in an ordinary shirt in the morning sun in front of his little house on an island. Then he strips off his shirt and, in trunks, dives into the sea. (Besides the fact that Moretti is introducing the man before the priest, he is also slyly seducing us with Italian hills and sky and sea.) Next we see Moretti in his robes performing a wedding ceremony in his little church. When the couple climb into a motorboat to start their honeymoon, Moretti gets in, too, with some bags. He is leaving the island.

He has been transferred to Rome, his hometown, to a small church on the outskirts, fallen into disrepair. But at least he is now able to visit his (well-to-do) parents and sister, all of whom he loves. He is also able to visit his pals from his pre-priestly days. One of them is turning hyperreligious; one is a terrorist on trial; one has become a latter-day Oblomov because of disappointments in love; one, a bookseller, is revealed as homosexual. (Books, by the way, are conspicuous in everyone's home.) As if these troubles were not enough, Moretti discovers that his church has lost its parishioners because the previous priest got married and now lives across the road with his wife and little son.

Moretti, assisted on the screenplay by Sandro Petraglia, ensures that the structure is more than an album of interesting people or a cross section of current Italian problems or a gamut of trials for the priest; though it *is* all these, it's a unified work. All the strands are finely interwoven, all the characters are urgent, vital. The cast is perfect, and I wish there were a more perfect word to describe their perfection. Moretti has obviously chosen his actors for their aptness, and just by doing so, he has also assembled a gallery of marvelous faces. The faces themselves speak. Only one of them was recognizable to me from previous films—Margarita Lozano, who plays Moretti's mother. Surely she is the most beautiful older woman on the screen today, with a beauty heightened by experience undergone and comprehended.

The tenor of the film's intent and of the priest's character is strongly hinted near the start. In his new quarters he is sitting on his shabby bed when a football comes through the window. He takes it into the yard to a group of boys who back up as he walks toward them silently. Then, as we anticipate, he suddenly kicks the ball and joins the game. He trips and falls headlong. Then, as we do not anticipate, the boys keep on playing, paying him no heed whatsoever. Spencer Tracy would have won their hearts by playing with them. Not Moretti.

With virtually every problem he faces, he meets disappointment. He is neither stupid nor clumsy: he is simply not able to bring enough that is useful to each difficulty, and there is no suggestion that his relative youth is the trouble. The dilemma is more subtle. He is a sincere priest. For most of his friends and his family, religion is not remote; they are Catholic. The film seems to be saying that there are now areas in life that neither dedicated priesthood nor organized religion can quite touch. At the end he leaves his now-restored church for one in Tierra del Fuego, for a few lonely parishioners who will need him.

One negative virtue of *The Mass Is Ended* is the absence of carnal temptation for the priest. As soon as we see that the protagonist is a young, good-looking cleric, we brace ourselves for the scene of temptation. It never arrives. What we do get, and which is much more interesting, not to say more comic, is the abundance of sexual problems in the people with whom he has to deal, including his fa-

FILMS WORTH SEEING

Colors. Pretends to be a serious study of L.A. gang wars. Really a fairly slick urban warfare flick. As cops, Sean Penn is surprisingly good, Robert Duvall is unsurprisingly better. (Reviewed 5/16/88)

A Taxing Woman. Juzo Itami's whiplash direction holds together this well-acted but wandering story of a woman tax inspector in Tokyo. (5/2/88)

White Mischief. A rarity: style makes a picture worth seeing—high-comedy style applied to scandal and murder among British aristos in Kenya, 1941. (4/11/88)

Wings of Desire. Peter Handke's screenplay about an angel who seeks mortality in Berlin, though overlong, is more engrossing than Wim Wenders's film of it. The script would probably make a good read. (5/23/88)

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ther. Making his own confession, Moretti tells a friar that all his parishioners confess sexual sins to him because they know such sins are venial. No one ever talks about real sins, like injuries to other human beings. (A Benedictine once told me the same thing about confessions that he heard.)

Yet this priest is neither sanctimonious nor namby-pamby. He is full of fire, of temper. Some of his more blatant errors come from his temper, as in a courtroom where he is summoned to testify for his terrorist friend. The one small blotch on the film is tied to his temper: after his sister quarrels with him and leaves, he punches his fist through a window. It's the one cinematic platitude in the picture.

Moretti as director—there's another extremely pleasant subject. To say that he is utterly competent is not enough. Gradually, through the film, we realize that we are not merely seeing the secure professional handling of every scene: in almost every scene, something is being done with the place and the composition to enrich the moment and the whole. For instance, after his father leaves home for a younger woman, the priest goes to see his mother. He is standing in the somewhat dim hall of their luxurious apartment, his back to us, looking at his mother in the room beyond. She is seated quietly on the sofa facing the sunlight to our left. The shot is lovely, but not gratuitously so. It crystallizes his view of his mother, and it also bespeaks the new light that has burst upon her. He moves out of the corridor into the room, and the camera follows to join mother and son in new, painful closeness.

How many other film artists like Moretti are there, O sages of film export and import? So many who write and direct and act at this level that you can afford to dally with Moretti's films? We now have *The Mass Is Ended*, but what about, for example, his *Golden Dreams*? It won a prize at the Venice Film Festival in 1981, and Bondanella said that "it may well turn out to be the *8½* of the 1980s." The 1980s are almost over. Why are we kept waiting?

THE CONSERVATIVE AT SEA

William F. Buckley, Jr., Patron Saint of the Conservatives by John B. Judis

(Simon and Schuster, 528 pp., $22.95)

No one can write a truly definitive biography of a man whose career is still far from over. But in telling the story of William F. Buckley Jr.'s successful life, John B. Judis has come remarkably close. Judis has apparently had unrestricted access to Buckley's personal papers, and to Buckley himself; he has talked with friends, relatives, and professional associates; he has read carefully through Buckley's extensive published writings. He has produced a thorough, intelligent book that should remain for some time the standard account of an important American life.

Buckley has spent much of his life inviting, indeed demanding, controversy and disagreement; but Judis portrays him with striking fairness and respect. He re-creates Buckley's aristocratic, at times flamboyant, personal world tolerantly, if with some bemusement. He explains Buckley's political ideas patiently and with balance. What criticisms Judis makes generally center on Buckley's failures to measure up to his own standards, not on his divergence from Judis's political values. This is in many ways a sympathetic, even an affectionate biography. It will undoubtedly surprise many readers that its author is an intellectual of the left, a senior editor of the socialist newspaper *In These Times*.

But Judis's ability to empathize with his subject is not as inexplicable as it might seem. For the Buckley who emerges from these pages exhibited through much of his life a political style that had much in common with that of the committed activists of the left. Buckley's aim, as he saw it, was not to defend established institutions, but to challenge and discredit them. He delighted in conflict, reveled in invective, called for (though he did not really expect) a revolutionary change in the nation's values.

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He was, Judis says, "the 'enfant terrible' of the Eastern intelligentsia" who brought to American conservatism "a philosophy of radical dissent rather than accommodation with the status quo." This was a radicalism of reaction, to be sure. The world for which Buckley agitated had little in common with the world the left liked to envision. But to those who consider a smug defense of the existing order the greatest threat to their hopes, he must once have been an oddly appealing figure.

In more recent years Buckley has seemed far from radical. He is visible today less as a political firebrand than as the witty, largely benign, and enormously self-satisfied author of sailing memoirs, personal diaries, and mystery novels. Judis treats this newer persona with less sympathy. Indeed, much of his book is an attempt to explain Buckley's transformation—in Judis's view, a decline—from militant activist to generic celebrity. Ultimately, then, this biography raises two important questions. Why did the privileged, aristocratic son of a wealthy businessman choose a career, and an intellectual outlook, so out of keeping with the norms of his class? And how, having established himself in the 1950s as the scourge of the establishment, did he reach so comfortably, and apparently so effortlessly, an accommodation with it 20 years later?

In most outward respects, Buckley's youth was indistinguishable from that of other children of wealth and power who grow up to embrace conventional values and established institutions. He was the son of a successful oil speculator; he lived on a palatial estate in Sharon, Connecticut, surrounded by servants, possessions, and entertainments; he traveled widely, attended elite preparatory schools in America and England, served briefly (and unhappily) in the Army during World War II, and then entered Yale. Yet for all that, Buckley grew up with a curious sense of social and cultural isolation. He was wealthy, cultured, cosseted, but he was always something of an outsider.

One reason for this was his father. Will Buckley Sr. made his fortune in the Texas oil fields, then raised his family in rural Connecticut. He was Irish and Catholic, but never did he or his children identify with the Irish-Catholic subculture in America; indeed, Will viewed that subculture with something close to contempt. Yet neither did he ever feel truly a part of the Protestant world in which he lived. The Buckleys generally kept to themselves, a large, close-knit family viewing the world outside their estate with skepticism, and at times with distaste. Will taught his children to detest communism and revolution, to reject the moral relativism of mainstream American culture, to embrace the most conservative norms of the Church as a defense against the false claims of modernity. He also taught them to think of themselves as a specially enlightened elite, destined to fight for a moral code and a social order threatened by the weakness and complacency of those in power.

The young Bill Buckley deeply revered his father and absorbed many of his moral and political teachings. He gradually discarded the most obnoxious of Will Sr.'s beliefs: the isolationism, the anti-Semitism, the racism. But he retained the fire. As an undergraduate at Yale, he attacked the faculty for teaching atheism and socialism, criticized the administration for embracing a "laissez-faire theory of education," called on the university to declare "active Christianity the first basis of enlightened thought and action" and "communism, socialism, collectivism, government paternalism inimical to the dignity of the individual." His precocious first book, *God and Man at Yale* (1951), created a furor with its demand that the university dismiss any faculty members whose teaching might, even indirectly, foster atheism or socialism.

AFTER A short tour of duty with the CIA, Buckley immersed himself in the still obscure world of right-wing journalism. He worked briefly for the floundering *American Mercury*, then resigned to write a book (in collaboration with his friend and brother-in-law, Brent Bozell) that offered a ringing defense of Joseph McCarthy and laid out an agenda for "McCarthyism" exceeding the senator's own stated intentions. "We find," Buckley and Bozell wrote, "that we are interested in talking, not about 'who is loyal?' but about '*who favors those policies that are not in the national interest as we see it.*'" Laissez-faire politics, they were saying, was no more acceptable than laissez-faire education. Government, like the university, must embrace and defend a public orthodoxy.

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nals, Buckley raised money to found his own political magazine and published the first issue of *National Review* late in 1955. It quickly became the most influential periodical voice of American conservatism—indeed, the only conservative publication with any impact at all outside the still narrow circles of the far right. It attracted the services of such established luminaries as Whittaker Chambers, James Burnham, and Willmoore Kendall. Over time, it provided a start to a number of bright young conservative intellectuals (John Leonard, Garry Wills, George Will, and others). It gave to conservative discourse an air of intellectual and literary seriousness that such discourse had largely lacked in the past. In 1963 Buckley expanded his influence with a widely syndicated column, which made his arch, erudite, polysyllabic style familiar to a broad audience for the first time. Three years later he started "Firing Line," which became notable for sharp ideological clashes between Buckley and his hapless, usually overmatched guests.

DRAWING BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

It has become fashionable in recent years, now that conservatism has established itself as a prominent intellectual force in American life, to give much of the credit to Buckley, to argue that he brought respectability and philosophical depth to the American right in an era when it was painfully wanting in both. Judis occasionally endorses this argument. Yet the case for Buckley's political importance seems somewhat halfhearted here. When compared with the embarrassingly shallow conservative intellectual community of the time, Buckley was, to be sure, strikingly serious and intelligent. But in the context of the broader world of ideas of the 1950s and '60s, he seems a much less impressive figure.

He was, of course, famous. For more than 20 years he was virtually the embodiment of American conservative thought. There were conservative political figures who had more power, but no one who had more visibility. Yet Buckley's influence was more remarkable for its range than its depth. He spoke and wrote constantly, but he often had little of substance to say. *National Review* (with which he quickly grew restless and came to edit only intermittently) was always wildly uneven. There were occasional articles of real intellectual merit, but more characteristic were glib and sophomoric polemics. Buckley's columns were clever and literate and usually entertaining, but they often read like stray thoughts dashed off in spare moments between airplane flights. (In fact, they sometimes were.) "Firing Line" was occasionally good entertainment, but seldom did its exchanges have much intellectual (as opposed to epigrammatic) substance.

In short, Buckley brought to conservatism a new wit, polish, glamour, and erudition. But he failed to provide (or even to reveal) a coherent ideological stance that would permit his ideas to move widely through American life. He tried once, in the early '60s, to write a "big book," a major theoretical work that would make a contribution to political theory. But he could never finish it, or even fully work out the ideas he wished to express. His abandonment of the book, Judis writes, "represented the abandonment of a deeper rationale for his own politics. And insofar as he left contradictions within his own views unresolved and unexamined, it meant the end of his development as a political thinker."

Buckley was better at attacking existing orthodoxies than at offering clear alternatives to them. His most impressive accomplishments were his stinging critiques of the premises of liberalism. The problem with liberals, Buckley argued, was not so much that their beliefs were wrong, but that they lacked any real beliefs at all. Their preoccupation with process had created a contentless public world, where even liberals themselves suffered from a sense of emptiness and alienation. "Liberalism cannot sustain our civilization on the little it has to offer," he wrote in 1959. "Liberalism cannot care deeply, and so cannot be cared about deeply.... There is nothing there of ultimate meaning to care for.... The large majority of students, angled as they are toward Liberalism, are silent, reflecting the great emptiness of their faith."

The purpose of the public world, Buckley believed, was not simply to protect individual freedom; it was also to foster a sense of civic virtue and religious morality. A good society must stand for something larger than the selfish interests of its individual members; it must embrace a set of moral and intellectual values and defend them against their enemies. Buckley never clearly defined what those values should be (other than an opposition to communism, an affirmation of Catholic morality, and a recognition of the value of intellectual

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elites); and that failure defined his limits as a political thinker. But he helped thrust into public discourse a critique of liberal orthodoxy that echoed some of the complaints of left-wing intellectuals such as C. Wright Mills, and that found its way into the ideology of the New Left as well as the New Right.

Despite his growing celebrity in the late 1950s and the '60s, Buckley seemed to retain in those years a sense of himself as an outsider. His most important relationships remained those with the right-wing theorists who gravitated to *National Review*. His greatest commitment continued to be the assault on communism and godlessness. He was still, in his own mind at least, a member of what the reactionary theorist Albert Jay Nock (whom Buckley greatly admired) had once defined as the "Remnant": a small intellectual elite whose members guard the real values of civilization against the dangerous clamor of the masses. "When everything has gone completely to the dogs," Nock once wrote, "they are the ones who will come back and build up a new society." Members of the "Remnant" did not compromise with the mainstream, did not strive for partial victories and limited accommodations. They tended the flame, preached to the unconvinced, waited for their time to come.

By the late '60s, however, there were signs that Buckley was growing impatient with this self-imposed marginality. His relentless search for an audience larger than the true believers of the right (through his syndicated column, his television talk show, his increasingly frequent campus speeches) was one sign of his restlessness. Another was his celebrated 1965 race for mayor of New York as the nominee of the Conservative Party, a race that generated enormous popular excitement and won him a startling 13.4 percent of the vote (nearly three times the showing of any previous Conservative candidate). He showed an increasing willingness to exchange ideological purity for political efficacy, a willingness that he began to articulate during the Goldwater campaign in 1964, and that helped him rationalize his long support of Richard Nixon after 1968 even while the president violated some of Buckley's most important conservative canons. One by one, Buckley broke ranks with his old allies at *National Review*. He began to fraternize instead with leading figures of the Eastern Establishment (including Henry Kissinger, the architect of the hated China initiative). In 1974 he joined the Council on Foreign Relations.

Instead of the conservative confreres who once formed his inner circle—Bozell, Willi Schlamm, Burnham—his most important friends began to be people with whom he had little in common ideologically, but much in common socially, among them John Kenneth Galbraith, Richard Clurman, David Niven. He was even, at times, a surprising ally of the left—through his harsh attacks on the John Birch Society, his (admittedly belated) embrace of the civil rights movement, his tolerance (and at times enthusiasm) for the counterculture, his endorsement of Allard Loewenstein's congressional candidacy in 1976, and his support for the decriminalization of marijuana. By the early '70s, few traces remained of Buckley's youthful radicalism. He had become less a lonely keeper of the flame of civilization than a pragmatic conservative attempting to influence the course of daily events and (not incidentally) keep himself in the public eye.

WHAT HAD happened? Judis's answer is fairly simple. Buckley was now a celebrity, greeted with warmth and acclaim even by his political opponents. As he become enamored of his own fame and imprisoned by his public persona, the political crusade lost its edge. A particularly vivid sign of this transmogrification, Judis argues, was the publication in 1971 of *Cruising Speed*, a diary of a week in Buckley's life. It offered a picture not of a committed political crusader but of a busy, successful man leading a life of constant achievement; a kind and generous man of protean talents; a contented man, reveling in the quality and texture of his life. (Buckley describes a meal his cook prepared during a sailing expedition: "We settle on a fish chowder, of which he is surely the supreme practitioner, and cheese and bacon sandwiches, grilled, with a most prickly Riesling picked up at St. Barts for peanuts.")

Cruising Speed was also a portrait of a public figure wrestling with his inability to fulfill his youthful ambitions, and rationalizing (with apparent discomfort) the role he had come to play. Responding to charges that he had not, finally, brought to conservatism a new theoretical depth, Buckley answered defensively, "The theoretical depth is *there*, and if I have not myself dug deep the foundations of American conservatism, at least I have advertised their profundity."

Although Buckley claimed to be satisfied with this constricted political role, he began in the '70s to turn his attention increasingly away from politics and toward personal accomplishments unrelated to ideology. He wrote best-selling spy novels (featuring an overdrawn, aristocratic protagonist, Blackford Oakes, modeled on Buckley him-

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self). He organized sailing expeditions across the Atlantic and published romantic accounts of them to great popular acclaim. He and his wife became important figures in New York society, a world in which few of the men and women with whom they had once associated moved. In 1982 he published another personal diary, *Overdrive*, which revealed how fully an absorption with his own life had replaced his earlier absorption with politics. It was a widely and justly ridiculed book, filled with self-satisfied tributes to Buckley's own tastes, achievements, and connections (including frequent reminders of his personal intimacy with Ronald and Nancy Reagan). He scarcely mentioned ideas and issues. Even many of Buckley's friends claimed at first to believe he had meant the book as a joke, until Buckley assured them he had not. "Form became substance," Judis writes, "and self-justification became the overweening motif to which the analysis and description of the external world were subordinated."

FOR JUDIS, then, Buckley's immersion in the world of celebrity has been the principal cause of his declining political influence. But it could also be argued that something like the opposite was true: that the political world had begun to turn away from Buckley before he turned away from it. For as conservatism gathered strength in the 1970s and '80s, Buckley—once its undisputed intellectual leader—began to lose his ascendancy. New conservative writers were now competing for attention: George Will, William Safire, Kevin Phillips. New political journals expressing the views of the increasingly influential neoconservatives were outdistancing *National Review* in their claim to serious attention. There was, beginning in 1981, a conservative administration that in theory served as a vindication of Buckley's long crusade, but that in practice (his personal friendship with the president notwithstanding) carefully and at times humiliatingly excluded him from its councils.

Even more important, perhaps, was the form American conservatism was taking in its hour of triumph. The "Reagan revolution" only occasionally represented the elitist, moralistic conservatism of the "Remnant," which Buckley had for so long defended. On the one hand, it showed insufficient ardor in the battle against communism, to which Buckley remained fervently committed. It was timid, he believed, in its Latin American policy; craven in its dealings with Iran; and dangerously naive in its accommodations with the Soviet Union. (He once called the administration's arms control agreements a "suicide pact.") On the other hand, the administration owed much of its success to an essentially populist message—an assault on, not a celebration of, elites—that Buckley (although he never said so) must surely have found difficult to swallow.

Buckley had despised George Wallace and other rabble-rousers of the right. He could hardly have been pleased by the successes of Jack Kemp, Richard Viguerie, Phyllis Schlafly, and other conservative populists of the '80s; and he must have recoiled at their prominent place in the Reagan coalition. Perhaps, then, his increasingly frivolous public activities were to a great extent an expression of political disappointment.

Judis makes no effort to disguise his disappointment with these developments. Buckley was at his best, Judis maintains, as a militant outsider. He is now a lesser figure. But this book closes on a note of what Judis evidently considers optimism. "With Reagan gone," Judis argues, "the lights of celebrity will dim, even for Buckley, and conservatives, including Buckley, will once again become the target for liberal barbs. Buckley could find himself in a familiar role—as a member of an embattled minority standing athwart history and yelling stop."

Those with more centrist inclinations than Judis may cherish different hopes. To them, the "new" Buckley must seem in many ways a wiser, calmer, more tolerant man than the enfant terrible of the 1950s and '60s: a man whose problem is not that he has shed his militancy, but that he has failed to articulate carefully or thoughtfully a mature political outlook. Even those who do not mourn the disappearance of Buckley's youthful radicalism must lament the way this appealing, intelligent, and increasingly generous man seems to be sacrificing his considerable gifts to the blandishments of celebrity.

ALAN BRINKLEY

Alan Brinkley teaches American history at Harvard University.

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

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THE ENDS OF THOUGHT

The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures by Jürgen Habermas translated by Frederick Lawrence

(MIT Press, 430 pp., $27.50)

Many important philosophers, especially in Europe, have adopted the same strategy for securing for themselves a place in the history of their field. In a nutshell, the strategy is to rewrite that history. More elaborately, it involves giving an account according to which earlier philosophers all addressed various aspects of a single very general problem, which is captured in its totality only by the author of that very account. In this way earlier philosophers are claimed as the author's precursors, and then the author can claim finally to have disposed of the problem at hand, and therefore to have brought a tradition to its end, or to have initiated a new tradition, or in some cases, both.

The modern master of this kind of narrative, which ultimately goes back to Aristotle, is Hegel, who considered his own philosophy to be the recapitulation and synthesis of all that was true in every earlier system. In an act of inimitable (no, alas, highly imitable) arrogance, whose main lines and details are immensely tendentious and complex, Hegel identified his thought with the end of philosophy, and his time with nothing short of the end of history itself. His view was not, of course, that nothing would happen any longer. It was, rather, that nothing radically new could ever happen again, in art, religion, philosophy, and history. All possible positions, already given a place within his own all-encompassing system, had been played out. Only rearrangements of what had already occurred could take place from now on.

The trouble, of course, was that new things were bound to happen, and did; new ideas were bound to be thought, and were. Ironically, many of Hegel's successors, having learned the trick from the master, turned the tables on him and assigned him a merely transitional role in their own accounts of philosophy. The latest of these accounts is Jürgen Habermas's attempt to write himself into the history of philosophy.

Habermas already occupies an important position in contemporary thought. His range of interests is immense, his learning prodigious, his passion exhilarating. He is at home in sociology, political theory, jurisprudence, and in both continental and analytical philosophy. His voice is listened to respectfully in Europe, and his thought is being studied carefully in America. This book is his effort to show that his position within the grand tradition of European philosophy is not simply important, but actually privileged.

The ambitious aim of these lectures is to address, criticize, and correct the philosophy Habermas believes to be characteristic of modernity. "Modernity" refers to the last 200 years or so of European history, as well as to a specific attitude toward time, society, and thought. In this narrative Hegel plays a central, if still transitional, role: "Hegel is not the first philosopher to belong to the modern age, but he is the first for whom modernity became a problem."

What is the "stubborn" problem that all modern philosophers, according to Habermas, have tried, without success, to resolve? In very general terms, it is this: Premodern society, we often like to believe, was a close-knit "organic" whole. Art, religion, and philosophy were not radically distinguished from one another. Religion, in particular, provided a sort of social glue linking individuals together; a similar function was served by tradition, by "models supplied from another epoch"—usually classical antiquity, as it was interpreted by late-18th-century Hellenists.

The modern age brought economic and industrial development, and created increasingly complex social forms; and the relationship between individuals and the state became progressively more problematic. At the same time, the Enlightenment provided a devastating attack on any appeal to religion or to tradition as grounds for justifying or criticizing any existing situation. The Enlightenment established Reason as the only court of normative appeal: "Modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself." Hegel tried to provide such internal norms by means of "the principle of subjectivity." Habermas understands by this the idea that reason and rationality reside in each individual. Individuals are therefore the ultimate court of appeal of all criticism or justification of the social world. They bear total responsibility for their actions.

Habermas believes that modernity went wrong right there, in its very beginnings. It is one of his central contentions that criticism requires an ideal norm, by reference to which every existing situation can be compared and evaluated. Unless we have a standard that holds good for all situations, we will not be able to criticize any. But it is impossible to construct such a standard, he argues, on the basis of the views of single individuals, who are themselves the products of the society they are supposed to criticize. "How can an intrinsic ideal form be constructed from the spirit of modernity, one that neither just imitates the historical forms of modernity nor is imposed on them from the outside?" Habermas's answer is that the principle of subjectivity does help to liberate individuals from the oppressive power of tradition, but that "it is not powerful enough to regenerate the unifying power of religion in the medium of reason." The standards we adopt as individuals inevitably reflect the values that we already accept; therefore they cannot provide an independent means of evaluating our life and our society.

According to Habermas, all the recent talk about "postmodernism" is just that: talk. In his view, all significant European philosophers, including Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault (as well as figures less famous on this side of the Atlantic, like Niklas Luhmann and Cornelius Castoriadis), are still engaged in "the philosophical discourse of modernity"—the project that gives his book its dialectical target. Prompted by Hegel's failure to provide standards of rational evaluation, all of modern philosophy has tried to improve on Hegel's "principle of subjectivity," or it has raised against it

> an objection that has not substantially changed. . . . The accusation is aimed against a reason grounded in the principle of subjectivity. And it states that this rea-

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son denounces and undermines all forms of suppression and exploitation, of degradation and alienation, only to set up in their place the unassailable domination of rationality.

In fact, it has become a common view that reason, despite its pretensions to provide greater freedom, ultimately functions as one more oppressive mechanism. According to this view, reason itself effectively maintains the objectionable conditions against which it appears to be directed.

HABERMAS TRIES to supply his own solution to this problem by rejecting "the principle of subjectivity," in order to chart his own way out of the philosophical discourse of modernity. He weaves a vast and sometimes fascinating fabric against this historical background. The lectures of which this book consists are enormously erudite; they radiate goodwill toward the figures addressed, even in the midst of trenchant criticism. They are also very complex and contorted. They are very hard to read, and they must have been almost impossible to listen to. Still, their general pattern is clear.

Habermas (who, as Anthony Giddens has pointed out, is very fond of three-part divisions) claims that the critics of modernity have followed, since Hegel's day, three basic strategies. The Left Hegelians, under the leadership of Arnold Ruge, declared that only what is rational is real, and that subjective ("bourgeois") reason represents a perverse form of rationality. Its object is to promote a specific social organization under the disguise of impartiality. Accordingly, they urged a turn to the practical and saw social revolution as the only means of achieving a truly rational, and therefore a just, society. This view, of course, was given its most complete expression by Marx, and Habermas follows its influence on 20th-century figures like Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer.

A contrasting approach was taken by the Right Hegelians, who included Eduard Zeller and Kuno Fischer. Their view was that whatever is real is rational, that once revolutionary ferment was calmed the essential goodness of society would become apparent. Such ferment, they believed, was mainly the product of the activity of radical intellectuals. As philosophers, therefore, they had to establish their rational insight against those intellectuals. In their suspicion of intellectuals, and in their reasons for their suspicion, Habermas sees (not without justice) a close anticipation of today's neoconservatism in Europe and America.

And then there was Nietzsche, who "wanted to unmask the dramaturgy of the entire stage-piece—revolutionary hope and the reaction to it." The Enlightenment's commitment to Reason had produced the fragmented and exploitative world of modernity. Hegel and his followers had made three attempts to reconceive Reason so that these shortcomings could be overcome by the very force that had originally brought them about: this is part of what is meant by the concept of "the dialectic of Enlightenment." But these attempts, Habermas claims, had all failed:

> Nietzsche had no choice but to submit subject-centered reason yet again to an immanent critique—or to give up the program entirely. Nietzsche opts for the second alternative: he renounces a renewed revision of the concept of reason and *bids farewell* to the dialectic of Enlightenment.

According to Habermas, "Nietzsche uses the ladder of historical reason in order to cast it away at the end and to gain a foothold in myth as the other of reason." Further, he "enthrones taste, 'the Yes and No of the palate,' as the organ of a knowledge beyond true and false, beyond good and evil. But he cannot legitimate the criteria of aesthetic judgment that he holds on to." I will leave aside the question of whether this reading of Nietzsche is convincing and follow instead Habermas's narrative, which credits Nietzsche with initiating two important approaches to rationality in 20th-century thought.

Both approaches are influenced by Nietzsche's notorious, and still obscure, "rejection of metaphysics." The first emphasizes Nietzsche's naturalistic, skeptical, historical, "genealogical" inquiries into the contingent origins of seemingly unshakable categories like morality and rationality—categories that Nietzsche often describes, again obscurely, as manifestations of "the will to power." Its practitioners are Georges Bataille, Jacques Lacan, and Foucault. The second approach also takes the rejection of metaphysics seriously, but it claims a privileged knowledge of that which metaphysics "left behind" when, with Plato, it became the dominant mode of thought in "the West." What metaphysics left behind is what Martin Heidegger, with whom Habermas classifies Derrida, calls "Being." The forgetting of Being, according to Heidegger, has led to what he considered to be the techno-

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logical debacle of our era; and to give Being voice again he developed (wrongly supposing that the superficial form of our language determines the kind of world we live in) a peculiar, dense, quasi-poetic idiom.

HABERMAS IS always patient and often generous (though sometimes he is abstruse) in characterizing and criticizing his opponents' views. Though he shares many of their misgivings about the modern world, though he wants to join them in their disenchantment, though he obviously feels a special admiration for Foucault, he considers them all as part of a single flawed tradition. He thinks that this tradition must be overcome, and he believes he knows how this can be done.

All of Habermas's 20th-century opponents, as he sees it, are part of "the philosophy of subjectivity." This philosophy takes as basic the experience of a single, isolated individual: a "subject," conceived by some as a thinker and by others as a producer, confronting an objective world. It finds its model of rationality in the "reflective" experience of that subject, when its very object of knowledge or production is nothing other than itself.

Habermas finally argues that this conception of human beings, and of reason, will never yield the normative principles that are necessary if reason itself, and the world created in its name, is to be rationally criticized. Criticism, he believes, requires criteria that transcend the situation of the individual. Even if there can be no absolutely objective criteria of what is right or wrong, true or false, Habermas believes that we need criteria that are what he calls, in a central term of his thought, "intersubjective," if particular criticisms are to be judged on their merits. Such merits, he continues, are established on the basis of reasonable agreement among different people as to what is and is not valuable or correct. But all the philosophy of subjectivity can provide is arbitrary individual preference.

Habermas believes that his own complex theory of "communicative action" (presented in two massive volumes, both now available in English) provides precisely the needed criteria. Whenever we engage in linguistic communication (which is absolutely basic to human beings) we produce utterances that are subject to criticism by others, to criticism on agreed-upon terms. This conception of reason is not subjective, but mutual, or intersubjective. Criticism, like agreement, presupposes an ideal situation, which Habermas often calls "undistorted or uncoerced communication."

This ideal is supposed to provide us with standards for criticizing the deviations from it that characterize the world in which we actually live. Such standards, both linguistic and social, are provided

> by the *higher-level intersubjectivity of an uncoerced formation of will* within a communication community existing under constraints of cooperation: in the universality of an uncoerced consensus arrived at among free and equal persons, individuals retain a court of appeal that can be called upon even against particular forms of institutional concretizations of the common will.

This passage nicely illustrates the difficulty of Habermas's writing style, though that, of course, does not count as any sort of objection. This difficulty is produced by the very high level of abstraction of Habermas's thought. But this, probably, is not a serious objection either: you must think abstractly if your object is to rewrite the history of philosophy of the last 200 years.

IT HAS already been objected against Habermas, notably by Richard Rorty, that what is conceived as "an uncoerced formation of will" is bound to reflect the specific situation from which it is visualized, every bit as much as the "principle of subjectivity" it is supposed to replace. Therefore it cannot provide an independent criterion for judging that situation. It has also been remarked that authors like Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and Foucault certainly seem like critics, not adherents, of the philosophy of subjectivity. But I have quoted the above passage for another reason: it illustrates, in particular, the extent to which Habermas's abstractness causes him to state the problem he has set for himself in such a form as to render it really intractable.

Moreover, his abstractness is responsible for his underestimating the contribution of authors like Nietzsche and Foucault to the criticism and evaluation of our forms of life. One of Habermas's central objections to Nietzsche and Foucault is that their attack on reason is subject to an insoluble self-referential paradox. By their very act of couching their attack on reason in discursive and rational terms, they necessarily presuppose the validity of reason. Foucault's approach cannot be preserved "from a relativist self-denial by means of its own tools." The critics of reason claim that their attack is correct; but if it is correct, then there must be a rational standard that shows that it is correct; and in that case, reason is vindicated, and their attack against it fails. Alternatively, he notes, "They cannot validate for their knowledge [that reason must be dismissed] any superiority according to standards of truth claims that would transcend local agreement." And in that case, which Habermas's theory of communicative action is specifically designed to avoid, there is no reason for us to believe what they say.

I WANT TO suggest that Habermas requires standards that "transcend local agreement" because he construes his project in unnecessarily abstract terms. He seems to believe that "modernity" designates a single all-encompassing phenomenon, that the problems it has generated are all due to a particular misconception of a single human faculty called "Reason." His critique must therefore be wholesale and itself all-encompassing. But for this he needs a place, a point of view, outside the all-engulfing object of his criticism: the theory of communicative action is intended to provide an ideal, if not an actual, point of view that transcends everything belonging to modernity. But if Nietzsche and Foucault would refuse to make this transcendental move, it is because they would not accept Habermas's analysis of modernity. In Foucault's last writings, in particular, we get the strong impression that his goal was to isolate single strands within a vast, complicated, and unhomogeneous web, which is named by the single term "modernity" only for convenience. "Reason," too, does not name a unitary faculty. Even "the individual" is not indissoluble. What we have in each of these cases, as Nietzsche would put it, is "a fat word replacing a very thin question mark."

We acquire our beliefs, our desires, our values at different times, in different circumstances, from various sources. Each one of us belongs to a number of distinct but overlapping communities, and each community has its own but overlapping standards of rationality—or, if you prefer, standards of communicative competence. We don't need to stand outside *everything* in order to criticize and evaluate the standards and practices, the "reason," of any particular community. All we need is a position outside *it*. This

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

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position is provided by the many other communities of which we are all members. Academics who also write for "general" audiences, as well as members of such audiences who manage to read those academics, will know what I mean.

Of course, the piecemeal criticism of culture that I am proposing in place of Habermas's totalizing approach is often unsuccessful. But then so is most of the comprehensive criticism of which I am aware. Our problems—moral, social, and intellectual—are concrete. Habermas is justly famous for his insightful analyses of, and his constructive suggestions about, many of these problems. He demands that we leave modernity and its philosophical discourse behind, but his urgent desire to define modernity prevents him from doing so. If there is a single feature that constitutes the essence of modernity, it is precisely the obsession to find the single feature that constitutes that essence. And that, surely, is one self-referential problem we are better off without.

ALEXANDER NEHAMAS

Alexander Nehamas is professor of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania.

REVISING THE REVISIONISTS

The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War by John Lewis Gaddis

(Oxford University Press, 332 pp., $24.95)

Scholars of recent American diplomatic history have divided along the same political lines as the subjects of their study, making the historiography of the cold war as tumultuous as its history (though considerably less threatening to world peace). The first interpretation of events was presented by the Western statesmen who helped shape them: Truman, Acheson, and, of course, Churchill explained in their memoirs how a reluctant America had been pushed into confrontation by the Soviet Union's relentless aggression and deceit. Among historians, Robert Ferrel, Adam Ulam, and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. endorsed this view. But revisionists, extending arguments made by Henry Wallace and at one point by Walter Lippmann, contested this interpretation. Some, like William Appleman Williams, argued that the two superpowers were equally responsible for postwar tensions; others went further, seeing America's aggression as a natural extension of its capitalism. Gabriel and Joyce Kolko made the extreme case, arguing that the cold war resulted not from international factors, but from a domestic American one: big business's need to expand.

Revisionism in American history has a bad track record. We do not now believe that the Founders wrote the Constitution to secure their personal property. We do not remember the War of 1812 as one fought to satisfy the bloodlust of congressional hawks, nor the Mexican War as a conflict that served the interests of rich slaveholders. We do not think that the United States entered the First World War to protect J. P. Morgan's loans, or the Second because Roosevelt manipulated the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor. Yet each of these positions had a large following in its day.

Cold war revisionism, a product of the 1960s and early '70s, may meet a similar fate. By the mid-1970s, younger historians returned to the central issues of the cold war, using declassified materials from the State Department to help them. One of them, John Lewis Gaddis, quickly garnered a reputation for thoroughness, writing with more balance and nuance than most of his predecessors. While accepting some of the revisionists' economic analysis—it is a useful corrective to the traditional overemphasis on politics—Gaddis has challenged their chief conclusions. He argues that a deterministic interpretation that stresses a single cause simply does not fit the facts.

Gaddis's new book, *The Long Peace*, is a collection of well-wrought and insightful essays that are, as the subtitle says, "Inquiries into the History of the Cold War." Each essay, in its own judicious way, drives one more nail into the coffin of cold war revisionism. There is no final nail, however, nor can there be: much of the revisionist case is based on speculation about Soviet intentions (the Russians are frightened, not ambitious; they expanded into Eastern Europe because they were unnerved by the Marshall Plan; and so on). Unless *glasnost* brings with it a Freedom of Information Act and unlocks Soviet state archives, fully half of the story must remain uncrowded by facts.

Gaddis scrupulously asks only questions that he can answer with evidence. For this reason, he focuses on American foreign policy-making. The essays dealing with the origins of the cold war are the best ones in the book. Each begins with a puzzle posed by traditional explanations and solves it by taking the reader on a journey inside the American policy-making process. Why, for example, did America perceive a threat from its wartime ally, the Soviet Union, soon after the war? Gaddis shows convincingly that the United States did not view the Soviet Union as an adversary at first. In fact, the State Department feared balance-of-power politics more than it did the Soviets; the diplomats were sure that the Soviets would act in harmony with the spirit of the United Nations. Later American policies may have been based on "overreactions," but from 1945 to 1950 it was "Soviet unilateralism" that changed the official American worldview.

Lest we attribute this change to a uniquely American moralism, Gaddis reports on recently declassified European documents that reveal British, French, and Scandinavian diplomatic corps to have been far more nervous about Soviet movements than were their counterparts in Washington. Using these archives, and adducing an internal debate between the State Department's top Soviet experts, George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, Gaddis makes clear that the United States was reluctant until the end to create a sphere of influence in Western Europe. It did so only in the wake of Soviet advances (mainly in 1948 in Czechoslovakia, Finland, and Berlin), but above all because the Europeans pressed for such a sphere with persistence and urgency.

Critics of American postwar policies paint a picture of an immature country whose foreign policy is beset by an excess of ideology, overreaction, and miscalculation. They often point for evidence to the 1950s, the decade of McCarthy, "massive retaliation," and

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"rollback." While Gaddis himself has made such criticisms previously, his three essays on this period raise significant exceptions. The first discusses the Truman administration's "perimeter defense" strategy, notorious from Acheson's 1950 speech declaring that the United States would defend the islands around, but not the mainland of, Asia (with the exceptions of Taiwan and Indochina). Acheson's strategy is generally considered to have been a fiasco. It may have invited the North Koreans to attack their southern neighbor; Taiwan had to be brought behind the shield within months; and Indochina's inclusion proved to be disastrous.

Yet Gaddis explains that the United States chose this approach for sound reasons. It wanted a friendly Asia, but it recognized that American air and sea power could not secure the mainland. The flaw in the policy was, rather, that these two concerns were not integrated, nor were they coordinated with the other military, economic, and political policies of the United States. In the long run, "perimeter defense" has been vindicated. Richard Nixon's opening to China, and his encouragement of Asian self-reliance, closely reflected the Truman administration's concerns. Thus today we may witness the paradox that with the withdrawal of American troops from the Asian mainland, except from South Korea, American influence there is at a postwar peak.

GADDIS ALSO addresses America's nuclear "self-deterrence" during this time. The Soviet Union has not used nuclear weapons for a simple reason: the United States has the capacity to retaliate. But for a whole decade the United States enjoyed either a monopoly or an overwhelming superiority in nuclear arms. Why did the United States, which used the atomic bomb twice, choose not to do so again after 1945? Gaddis sees nothing inevitable about it. He points out that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations consciously followed policies that tended to preclude nuclear use. More important, they chose not to "use" American superiority to compel the Soviets to modify their external or internal politics, but instead to deter war (a fact that still rankles some strategists on the right).

On every occasion after 1945 that either president considered the use of nuclear weapons, he was dissuaded by the same military, political, and moral logic—the means were disproportionate to



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

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the end. Gaddis writes, "The fact that the Americans worried about this sort of thing—not all countries in similar circumstances would have—may well account for the fact that our experience with nuclear weapons is still as providentially limited as it is." This is not enough for writers like E. P. Thompson and Daniel Yergin, who have insisted variously that presidents should never have even considered using nuclear weapons. But it would be irresponsible for a president not to consider what might happen if deterrence fails.

Like most of his colleagues, Gaddis accepted the received wisdom that the United States in the 1950s viewed communism as an international monolith, thus missing the opportunity to exploit growing Sino-Soviet tensions. He describes his genuine shock, then, when he stumbled upon, in the Eisenhower library, a briefing to the president from that messianic anti-Communist, John Foster Dulles, explaining the tensions between China and Russia, predicting that Mao would not accept Moscow's domination, and urging a policy that would widen this crack. This provoked Gaddis to reconsider the subject. In the most striking and original essay in the book, "Dividing the Adversary," Gaddis quotes an array of documents showing that several senior diplomats in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations were acutely aware of the strains of nationalism within the Soviet bloc and proposed a "wedge" strategy to enlarge them. This was a long-term perspective, however; Acheson and then Dulles had to confront the inexorable reality of China's obedience to Moscow on every issue of the day—Korea, the U.N., Hungary, Suez. The grand strategy, which was ignored entirely during the '60s, eventually proved to be the wise one. But it took a long time, and a skillful diplomat in Henry Kissinger, before the United States could benefit from the Sino-Soviet rift. (Here Gaddis, like most diplomatic historians, focuses almost exclusively on the executive branch. Had he looked at congressional records he would have found much evidence for the United States having a monolithic view of communism.)

The picture that emerges from Gaddis's accounts of a thoughtful and restrained America in the late 1940s and early '50s may surprise some. But Americans on both the right and the left have been too worried that their country, in its hour of prominence, has acquitted itself badly. The record suggests such self-criticism is exaggerated. Though Washington's reaction to Third World revolutions has been crude, this has been, for better and worse, a secondary American concern (deterring World War III being the primary one); and earlier great powers handled such upheavals with considerably less humanity, usually through conquest and colonization.

By any historical yardstick, America's performance in the early years of the cold war merits pride—especially considering that this great power, unlike the monarchies of the past or its rival superpower of the present, operates without the luxury of centralized, unquestioned power. It nurtured democracy in two highly undemocratic and aggressive nations (Japan and Germany); it helped a shattered Europe become prosperous and free; it sincerely attempted international cooperation by founding the United Nations. Most important, it established a peace that has lasted as long already as the famed 19th-century arrangements of Metternich and Bismarck.

Gaddis's last essay suggests that historians may look back on our times not as the cold war, but as the "Long Peace." Here he moves from history into political science, considering what structures have made this international system so long-lived and stable. Gaddis relies heavily on the work of the political scientist Kenneth Waltz, who argues that a bipolar world is inherently more stable than a multipolar one; it is simple and requires no Bismarcks to maintain it. Most of Gaddis's other reasons are predictably Waltzian: the restraining effect of nuclear weapons, the claim that interdependence between the superpowers—heightened cultural, economic, and political connections—does not promote peace (most wars take place between countries, often neighbors, that know each other intimately). In this view it is precisely because there are so few points of contact between America and Russia that there have been so few pretexts for war.

NEW OR OLD, an important lesson of the cold war concerns the art of peacemaking. History suggests that there are three kinds of peace: the Peace of Rome, in which the victor disarms the adversary, or even destroys the adversary, as Rome did Carthage; the Peace of Westphalia, in which the adversary is accommodated; and the Peace of Versailles, in which one neither destroys nor accommodates the adversary, leaving a potentially powerful and dissatisfied opponent. The peace of the cold war combines in it the first two, more stable arrangements. It eliminated two adversaries—Germany by partition, Japan by a constitutional ban on a military—and accom-

THE RAINBOW DIARY

It's summertime. Let's go everybody. Everybody ready?
A family packing for a trip, three boys, their hair cut
in burrs, the mother holding a campstool and looking
at the oldest boy who's looking at the middle boy who's
looking at the youngest while they duel with fishing rods
and the father looks at the mother. Will they catch many fish?
How much will be spoken? How much will they leave unspoken?
See the youngest slit his leg with a fish knife? Watch
the middle boy, his hand severed by the outboard and drifting
like a small shoe to the lake bottom. Is the oldest losing
an eye, the iris snagged like a rainbow trout? Is the father
driving their car, with all of them in it, into the river?
Is the mother whispering prayers? How much love can they kill?
How many fish can they catch? How many will they throw back?
How many will get away? See the car fly backward from river
to road? Such a home movie! Watch the boy's hand turn and swim
back to its wrist and join—how the skin sutures itself!
Many wounds will heal. Many words will be spoken.
They're teasing over dinner. No furies, no sudden danger.
What about hope? What about the blue and yellow and orange
pages of the mother's journal? "Today, dear diary, another first . . ."

MARTIN MCGOVERN

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modated the great potential one, Russia, in Eastern Europe. Were the essential distribution of power less realistically balanced, it is not clear what affect nuclear weapons and bipolarity would have on the international system.

Gaddis thinks we "lucked" into a system that reflects the realities of power, but there may be more to it than that. Pacifying Japan and not contesting the Soviets in Eastern Europe were conscious U.S. policies. Of the three elements that shaped the balance of power, that leaves only the partition of Germany to chance. Today American grand strategy must consider how it would respond to a major change in these power relationships—say, a Japanese or Chinese desire to become a first-rank military player—because such a move might well destabilize this system far more than an increase or cut in the nuclear stockpiles would. Of course, mere stability has often struck the more demanding visionaries of foreign policy as a morally bankrupt goal to pursue. Some on the left propose that we bring justice to South Africa; others on the right want to bring justice to Eastern Europe. But before casting aside order in the elusive quest for morality, we might consider its modest advantages.

Compare 1945 with 1919. At Versailles statesmen attempted to impose a just order on the realities of the world. They dismembered the Austro-Hungarian empire on the basis of ethnic and linguistic self-determination; they punished Germany but weren't too severe, leaving a wounded and enraged nation. This "just peace" collapsed within 20 years. In 1945 the realities of the world imposed a stable order on the statesmen. Germany and Korea are tragically and unjustly divided, Eastern Europe is once again a semicolonized buffer zone. But the peace of 1945 is in its 43rd year and shows no immediate signs of collapse. It provides a framework within which we can promote our values without blowing up the world in the bargain.

This account may convey the impression that behind Gaddis's careful qualifications and understatement is a hardliner who can find no fault with American foreign policy—a hawk in dove's feathers. But that would misrepresent Gaddis and the kind of history he writes. He attempts to explain events as they took place, when they took place, through the participants' eyes. He tries to free himself from "the tyranny of knowing what came next," exploring the very real alternatives that policy-makers chose among. Most of all, he resists judging the past from the perspective of the present.

This need not reduce the historian to a chronicler who merely accumulates facts. As Gaddis writes, "To recapture what was in the minds of Western leaders as the cold war began requires . . . something of an imaginative leap." Leopold von Ranke, the great 19th-century German historian who commanded the romantics of his age to stop myth-making and "show what actually happened," explained that one needs an "affection" for "humanity as it is," good and evil, noble and brutal, not as it should be. This understanding of statesmen's intentions and dilemmas characterizes *The Long Peace*. Gaddis's conclusions, though clearly separated from the facts he records, seem true to them.

FAREED ZAKARIA

Fareed Zakaria, a former TNR reporter-researcher, is a doctoral candidate in government at Harvard University.

THE CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMISSARS

Romain Rolland and the Politics of Intellectual Engagement by David James Fisher

(University of California Press, 378 pp., $32.95)

Romain Rolland was one of the most ambitious writers of his generation, and now he is probably one of the least read. He was born in 1866, and by the time he was awarded the Nobel Prize in literature in 1915, he had an international reputation as a novelist and a biographer, and as the author of several plays. His biographies of Beethoven, Michelangelo, and Tolstoy were best sellers, and his ten-volume novel, *Jean-Christophe*, completed in 1912, caught the imagination of thousands of young Europeans full of Nietzschean ideas and trying to rise above the social and international conflicts of their time.

The novel is the life story of a German composer—naïf, impulsive, and tactless, but full of vitality and originality—and his deep friendship with a young French intellectual who dies in a political riot. The memory of his friend haunts Christophe for the rest of his life, through the vicissitudes of his musical career, his love affairs with several women, and his experiences in France, Switzerland, and Italy. The novel has no explicit political message, but it implies a call for reconciliation between France and Germany, and an appeal for a warmhearted commitment to a kind of populist humanism that remained the essential element in Rolland's political beliefs.

Rolland, the son of a modest family of lawyers in Burgundy, was by training a historian and musicologist. Before he became famous as the author of *Jean-Christophe*, he taught at the Sorbonne and was involved in various attempts to launch a new popular theater that would educate the workers and mobilize them for political action. Although he was committed to the left (if not in any very precise way) early in his life, it was not until World War I that he found himself actively taking up a public political position. It is here that David James Fisher takes up the story in his interesting study of Rolland's ideas and his role as a great exponent of "*littérature engagée*," a writer whose pen was henceforth committed to a series of perhaps not wholly consistent political causes.

In the early months of World War I, Rolland was living in Switzerland, where he spent much of the rest of his life. It was from there that he published his series of articles, *Au dessus de la Mêlée* (Above the Struggle), which established him as a leading figure in the struggle against the war, and in the campaign to preserve international links and to resist the flood of war propaganda from both sides. Rolland made himself unpopular, especially in France, by his refusal to accept the stories of German atrocities that were believed without question by the French and British public. Although Rolland's critics pointed out that it was easy to adopt this attitude in neutral Switzerland, where he was outside as well as above the struggle, Rolland's gesture was

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still a brave and striking one. It established the reputation he was to acquire in radical circles as "the conscience of Europe."

Rolland's idealistic pacifism, and his attempt to keep in touch with intellectuals on both sides in the war, inevitably drew him nearer to those people for whom resistance to war necessarily involved working for revolution. At first he tried to remain aloof, in the name of intellectual independence, from any active revolutionary movement, though both Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg were anxious to enlist the support of a man who by now was a famous international figure. By the end of the war, and after the Bolshevik Revolution, Rolland found his detachment increasingly difficult to maintain. The old liberalism had failed. The duty of an intellectual who aspired to be a leader of opinion lay elsewhere. Rolland wrote at the end of 1918:

> The moral abdication of President Wilson, abandoning his principles without having the frankness to admit it, signals the ruin of the great bourgeois idealism that for a century and a half ensured the ruling class of its prestige and its strength, in spite of its many errors. The consequences of such an act are incalculable.

As yet, however, Rolland's own political commitment was extraordinarily unfocused. In a "Declaration of Independence of the Mind," published in January 1919, he wrote (in the characteristic vague high-mindedness of his public pronouncements):

> It is we who are servants of the Mind. We have no other master. . . . Our duty is to maintain a fixed point, to point to the polar star in the midst of the swirling passions of the night. . . . We honor Truth alone, free, frontierless, limitless, without prejudices of nations or castes. Assuredly, we are not uninterested in Humanity. It is for Humanity that we work, but for it *as a whole*. We do not know peoples. We know the People—unique, universal—the People that suffers, that struggles, that fails and that constantly rises to its feet again, and that always marches along a rough road drenched in its blood.

Much of Fisher's book is devoted to showing the ways in which this diffuse humanitarianism, and the belief in the intellectual as a spiritual leader, came to an end in the 1930s with Rolland's adherence to Stalinist communism. Indeed, when Rolland is remembered at all today, it is usually as the archetypal fellow traveler.

THE WAY WAS by no means a direct one. Indeed for much of the decade after the end of the war, Rolland's main commitment was to the work and the personality of Gandhi, a biography of whom he published in 1924. Rolland's idealism was based on a mystical sense of contact with universal forces. Fisher writes early in his book about Rolland's contacts with Freud (who much admired him) and their correspondence on Rolland's concept of the "oceanic" sensibility—a "sensation of the eternal (which may very well not be eternal but simply without perceptible limits and in that way oceanic)." For Rolland, Gandhi seemed to combine the active opposition to imperialism that was an important part of his own political creed with an Indian mysticism with which Rolland had for some time been in sympathy. (Hermann Hesse dedicated his novel *Siddhartha* to him.) Gandhi was, Rolland wrote in the subtitle to his biography, "the man who became one with the Being of the Universe." Moreover, Gandhi's doctrine of nonviolence seemed to Rolland, for a time at least, to offer an alternative to Lenin's way of making a revolution, one that might avoid the abuse of power and the persecution of opponents that had made Rolland critical of the Soviet Union.

But by 1932 Rolland was becoming disillusioned with Gandhi, partly as a result of a five-day visit Gandhi paid to him at his Swiss villa in December 1931, partly because of Gandhi's misplaced enthusiasm for Mussolini. (Gandhi was later to say that Mussolini and Rolland were the only Europeans worth knowing.) By the mid-1930s Rolland had in any case lost his faith in nonviolence: "In the face of the growing ferocity of the new regimes of totalitarian dictatorships . . . we cannot . . . advocate and practice Gandhi's doctrine however much we respect it." Rolland's last phase, one of total commitment to the Communist Party line, was about the begin.

EARLIER Rolland had maintained that for all his belief in internationalism and peace, he was still in some sense "*au dessus de la mêlée*." "Certainly I prefer Moscow to Washington," he had written in 1924, "and Russian Marxism to American imperialism. But I claim to remain independent of one as of the other." Now he believed that Russia was the only hope in the struggle against imperialism and fascism. This new course found expression in the leading role he played in the "Amsterdam-Pleyel" movement, named for its founding conferences at Amsterdam in 1932 and at the Salle Pleyel in Paris in 1933. This organization of leading intellectuals is now widely regarded as a successful example of the way in which the Communists enlisted non-Communists in a front organization to support their policies and increase their power. Rolland denied this: "I am not a man . . . to be used as a blind and passive instrument."

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But as Russia seemed to be the most effective force opposed to fascism and Nazism—during the time that the Popular Front was attempting to mobilize a broad body of support spreading far beyond the Communist Party—Rolland's attitudes toward the Soviet Union became more and more uncritical. He had already sketched some of the problems this commitment would involve in another long "roman fleuve," the seven-volume *L'Ame Enchantée*, completed in 1933. For all its sentimentality and melodrama (as well as its frank discussion of sexual relations, including homosexuality and incest), it paints a vivid picture of the political ferment and uncertainty among young French men and women in the 1920s and conveys very strongly the extraordinary romantic appeal to many of them of revolutionary Russia.

Rolland's involvement with Russia became more intense throughout the 1930s: he quarrelled with André Gide (they had never liked each other much anyway) when Gide published his critical *Retour de l'URSS* in 1937. (Rolland had spent a month in Russia two years earlier and had kept silent about any misgivings he may have felt.) Although worried by the Soviet purges, he comforted himself with parallels from the French Revolution: Danton's death was historically justified because "he also betrayed the revolution." Rolland also wrote a play, *Robespierre*, in 1939, to explore some of the moral issues raised by revolution. He was upset when his appeals to Stalin for clemency toward some of his personal acquaintances went unanswered; but still he believed that any public criticism would only weaken the remaining hope of a common front against fascism. When the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed in August 1939, he resigned from the Association of Friends of the Soviet Union, but he kept his resignation private. He did not want it to be "brutally exploited by the adversaries of the Soviet Union." For the moment, "We must wait and be silent."

BY NOW Rolland was old and in failing health. He had returned to France in 1939 and lived quietly in the steep street leading up to the great Romanesque basilica of Vézelay. After the fall of France, he sympathized with the Resistance. He was often under police surveillance, and he never concealed his opinions. He died at the end of 1944, convinced that there was a continuity between his earlier views and those of the triumphant Resistance, and with the knowledge that the Russian victories had done more than anything else to ensure Hitler's defeat.

Fisher has given a full account of the various stages of Rolland's career as an engaged intellectual. It is based almost exclusively on Rolland's own writings; one would have liked more about the influences on him and about his relations with his contemporaries. Sometimes the chronology is hard to follow. Fisher writes that Rolland's *Greeting to the Spanish Revolution* "signifies his consciousness that the Spanish Civil War had become the crucial world arena for the fight against fascism," but the text was published in 1934, and the Civil War did not break out until 1936.

HIS PUBLISHERS tell us that Fisher is a research psychoanalyst. He might have used his qualifications to explore more fully Rolland's personality and the psychological pressures that led to his political attitudes. It is interesting, for example, to learn in passing that at the time of the Dreyfus case, Rolland's marriage to a Jewish woman was breaking down, and that he carefully refrained from taking sides over the Dreyfus affair, telling one of Dreyfus's leading supporters that he did so because of his anti-Semitic feelings. Just as interesting, it has sometimes been said that his second wife, Marie Kudachev, influenced him in his attitude to Russia, whereas his sister Madeleine, who had been his closest companion before his second marriage in 1934, had been more in sympathy with his earlier pacifist phase.

But perhaps these are matters on which we will never find adequate evidence. That may explain Fisher's decision to treat his subject as an austere piece of intellectual history rather than as a biography, and to limit himself to Rolland's writings, especially his published work. This book does not tell us much about Rolland's fiction. Yet the world of *Jean-Christophe*, and especially that of *L'Ame Enchantée*, tells us as much about Rolland's moral and political attitudes as his febrile and rhetorical contributions to public causes. Without the novels and the volumes on Beethoven, he would never have won the international public position that enabled him to become the kind of engaged writer he was; they are an integral part of his intellectual biography. Certainly his political pronouncements alone, carefully and fairly expounded and analyzed in this book, hardly justify his reputation. They may well have contributed to its eclipse.

JAMES JOLL

James Joll is professor emeritus of international history at the University of London.

CORRESPONDENCE, *from page 6*

quire Catholic hospitals to perform abortions, and then pointed out that this concern was largely unfounded. Second, Yard isn't entirely forthcoming in her account of NOW's actions. She neglects to mention that she pushed for withdrawal of the bill—a move that, considering the four years required just to get the CRRA near passage, could well have killed it. Pulling Title IX from the CRRA posed the same problem. Finally, Yard twice refers to the loss of "our constitutional right to abortion." The Danforth amendment said simply that hospitals affiliated with religious institutions couldn't be required to perform or pay for abortions. Abortion is, of course, still legal and still constitutional.

BLOOM AND THE GREAT BOOKS

To the editors:

Richard Rorty is absolutely right that Allan Bloom's *Closing of the American Mind* and E. D. Hirsch's *Cultural Literacy* are very different books ("That Old-Time Philosophy," April 4). I hope, however, that his endorsement of Hirsch's reforms for precollege education does not lead readers to conclude that one who rejects Bloom's education recommendations should welcome Hirsch's. The proposal that children should learn by rote an enormous set of "cultural allusions" would be for Dewey just one more example of the misguided tendency of American educators to cut off learning from genuine thinking. Dewey would not, by the way, reject Hirsch's program because he advocated teaching " 'skills' as opposed to 'content.' " Perceiving content and skill as inseparable in life, he warned educators against their divorce in school. Rorty's point is well taken that Hirsch, in contrast to Bloom, "wants to make the students better citizens of a democracy." Dewey wanted this too. However, believing that citizenship in a democracy in-

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volves the interplay of thought and action, reason and emotion, he would surely be telling us, were he alive today, that Hirsch's project of improving citizenship by teaching allusions is a tragic illusion.

JANE ROLAND MARTIN
Cambridge, Massachusetts

To the editors:
Neither Richard Rorty nor Harvey C. Mansfield Jr. ("Democracy and the Great Books," April 4) had occasion to discuss an important and, for me, revealing feature of Allan Bloom's book: its fervent anti-feminism. Bloom would have us revere the Great Books, but would gladly return to the gentility of an all-male (and mostly white) Harvard and Yale. He would have us teach our children that there are moral and aesthetic distinctions to be made, but would perpetuate senseless and mean restrictions on women's life choices in the name of "tradition." What we seek, and what Bloom does not provide, is a way to make the most important distinctions—between those values worth keeping and those to which we gladly say "good riddance." Is it really true that we cannot respect the Great Books without enforcing conventional roles for women?

AMY L. WAX
Silver Spring, Maryland

FROM 'BAD' TO WORSE

To the editors:
TNR's editorial "Bad" (April 18) accuses the networks of not reporting on significant character issues concerning the Rev. Jesse Jackson, pointing specifically to Jackson's misinterpretations following Dr. King's assassination. I guess you missed the profile I did on February 24 on "World News Tonight with Peter Jennings." Nearly half of the three-minute profile dealt with this very issue. It included the original footage of Jackson on the night of April 4, 1968, making the statements to the press that were later disputed. You would have seen a very steely-eyed Jackson who now refuses to discuss the issue. You would have seen footage of Jackson during his PUSH days, as well as his rather lame excuse today for the problems of the organization he ran.

REBECCA CHASE
ABC News
Atlanta, Georgia

To the editors:
I wish TNR would tone down its histrionic savaging of Jesse Jackson. Some of the criticisms are valid, and there are plenty of moderates such as myself who would prefer not to have him on the ticket. But TNR's depiction of Jackson as a monstrous composite of Farrakhan, Neville Chamberlain, and the Rev. Al Sharpton is nasty and divisive. Is Jackson's pro-Palestinian tilt any worse than Al Gore's play for the New York Jewish vote? Both have made commitments that undermine their ability, should they become president, to gain the trust of more than one side in the Mideast conflict. If Jesse's slant seems to be the more dangerous one, it may be because it reflects his authentic beliefs, not an opportunistic pandering for votes. Jackson is picking up white support in part because he seems to have actual convictions and feelings and not just politicians' vapidity. The "moral visions" articulated by Jackson and Robertson appeal to many as a dynamic response to "America's decline." For better or worse Robertsonian moralism will henceforth be a force in Republican politics while Jackson's moral ideology will strongly influence the Democrats. Those of us who object to some elements of either crusade will have to identify the lesser evil and make accommodations. TNR editors should realize this and stop talking as if the Democratic Party is Linda Blair and they're providential exorcists.

THOMAS ROBBINS
Rochester, Minnesota

THE POT FACTOR

To the editors:
Like too much of the news media lately, THE NEW REPUBLIC has lost its way when talking about the use of drugs by young people. Hendrik Hertzberg, in "What's Left of Gore" (April 18), uses Albert Gore's pot smoking to heap praise upon the candidate. Granted, during the 1960s many college students besides the Gores used drugs. But "everyone of their age and class who had a spark of curiosity and daring"? I think not. Clearly, many of Gore's contemporaries resisted the urge to experiment with controlled substances, just as they resisted other illegal temptations. I am not condemning Gore—in fact, I support him. But his pot-smoking two decades ago certainly would not make him a better president, nor would whatever in his character drove him to puff away. I wonder whether Hertzberg would explain crack use by inner-city kids as a similar manifestation of age, class, curiosity, and daring. Better yet, I wonder how he would distinguish between their drug use and Gore's without sounding elitist.

MICHAEL SUNDEL
Ann Arbor, Michigan

THE ARAFAT OPTION

To the editors:
I challenge Masud Husain to point to a single written statement by Yasir Arafat in which he says that he is willing to negotiate with Israel for a Palestinian state that would not threaten the security of Israel (Correspondence, May 9). For the last ten years Arafat has played a devious game of whispering peaceful statements to friendly correspondents and congressmen while his actions and his statements in Arabic show an entirely different agenda.

On December 1, 1978, then Congressman Paul Findley, a good friend of the PLO, issued the following statement, which Arafat had dictated to him in Damascus: "If an independent state is established in the West Bank and Gaza with a connecting corridor, the PLO would renounce any and all violent means to enlarge the territory of that state. The PLO would live at peace with all its neighbors and would give de facto recognition to the State of Israel." This statement contains many of the elements required to protect Israel's security. Much more would be needed, but it could be the beginning of serious negotiations.

Efforts through the years by those working for peaceful coexistence, including me, to get Arafat to repeat the Findley statement directly were fruitless. It is not too late. If Arafat wanted a peaceful settlement, he and Shamir could communicate in writing to Secretary of State George Shultz. If Arafat would set forth the Findley statement in his own name as the PLO terms for a settlement, it could change the course of history.

JESSE ZEL LURIE
Pleasantville, New York

The editors welcome correspondence from readers. Letters should include the writer's full name, address, and telephone number; be typed double-spaced; and be held to under 200 words. Letters may be edited for space. Please address letters to: Correspondence, TNR, 1220 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

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NEW YORK DIARIST

Irises

A FRIEND JUST sent me some clippings from the British press about the recent Impressionist and Modern painting sales at Christie's and Sotheby in London. The very few good things and a fair number of big-name but not so good pictures fetched astronomically high prices. Souren Melikian in the *Herald-Tribune*, Geraldine Norman in the *Independent*, and the author of the leading financial column in Fleet Street, the unsigned "Lex Column" in the *Financial Times*, all sensed something wrong. Norman, a resentful class-war ideologue if ever there was one, smelled tax cheating and conspiracy in the passing of so many undistinguished Impressionist paintings into anonymous private hands. The two other writers thought a post-October 19 mood hung over the salesrooms with disaster only a breath away. Overshadowed by the few irrationally high prices of a few paintings were a large number of unsold works. And the very profusion of overvalued, overpriced second-rate material may have reflected the desperation of the auction houses to stoke their overheated boilers and keep up the impression of a hot market. Front-page stories of record prices help do just that.

ON THE OTHER HAND, all these conspiracy theories don't quite ring true. I too am still trying to adjust my reactions to the world of $50 million paintings, but I wonder whether neo-Marxist art analysis is not wide of the mark. My own pet theory is that all this buying may not be "commodification" of art at all. These superprices paid by Japanese corporations and Australian tycoons really represent a curious revival of medieval ethics: the elevation of relics and icons of a holy time in human creativity. Maybe it's a 20th-century version of the head of Saint Anne and the Virgin's tunic, which were sold to French kings in the 11th century to be housed in Chartres Cathedral. Until about 50 years ago we built churches everywhere. Now we and the Japanese (our imitators and epigones) are building museums. This belief in art and its power to outlast us may be all we have to cling to. Most great houses in Europe once had private chapels. Now the mansions of Bel Air, Malibu, Southampton, and Palm Springs have private art galleries.

TAX TIME has come and gone, and the subject of superprices for works of art reminds me of the terribly shortsighted changes in the tax laws related to donations of art to public collections. In a country that provides absolutely no public monies for acquisition of art, even for the National Gallery (although the Park Service is funded to acquire desirable wilderness areas and historical places), the tax advantages for giving works of art spurred the phenomenal growth of our museums. Now, as van Gogh-type prices for the very best put our museums out of competition for purchases, the new tax regulations, which diminish the financial advantage of donating appreciated property, effectively kill the major impetus for private giving. Museums cannot afford to buy art, and private individuals are now discouraged from giving it. In fact, the previous owner of van Gogh's *Irises* cited the changes in the law as his primary reason for selling instead of giving the painting to the gallery designed to house it.

I SUPPOSE with budget crises looming as far as we can see into the future, it will be a long time before many of our legislators will pay attention to the art drain that stronger foreign competitors, a weak currency, and this foolish law have encouraged. For two centuries America was a country into which art flowed. Now we're a country from which art flows. In a particularly egregious gesture, the U.S. Customs Service has instituted a modest but still onerous import charge on all art coming into the country. It's the thought that counts.

AT A RECENT conference I attended on the issue of high art prices and their effect on our museums, I suggested somewhat frivolously that we develop other incentives for collectors to give their art away for the common good. The tax advantage is effectively gone, and it was tacky anyway—just another "shelter." In England you get a knighthood (think of Sir Andrew Mellon, Sir Chester Dale, Sir Solomon Guggenheim), and in France a ribbon in your buttonhole of the Legion d'Honneur. Why can't we have an order? The only difference would be that ours would be strictly for art philanthropy, not for political connections. And it shouldn't already boast Frank Sinatra as a charter member.

IN 1977 I wrote a piece for the *Times* of London called "Shopping at the Museum." I lamented the growth of museum shops and mail-order catalogs selling "adaptations" of artworks in their collections in the form of scarves, handbags, plates, or jewelry. For good measure I also asked how much "education value" there could be in so-called faithful reproductions of Greek, Renaissance, Egyptian, or Oriental statuettes in a soaplike plastic called "polymer." Today museum merchandising is far more extensive than it was even then. The level of anti-art atrocities committed by those whose mandate is to educate our eyes to quality has increased along with it, encouraged by the tax exemption this "education" now enjoys. More shocking is the almost complete absence of protest at this schlock by the guardians of good taste and scholarly standards. Our educators are visually illiterate, our artists cynical, and our art historians more interested in the economic causes of art than in art itself. But I wonder why Bloomingdale's or the mail-order catalog companies don't protest the unfairness to them of tax-free competitors.

THE FINAL INSULT from this wave of museum retailing came in last Christmas's catalog from the Boston Museum. It offered a small statuette "adapted from" the great Degas sculpture *The Little Dancer of 14 Years* in a material called "reconstituted metal." I sent for one and for $59.95 received in due time a monstrous little homunculus that looks vaguely like a rhesus monkey—such an irresponsible travesty of a work of art that, were I the commissioner of internal revenue, I would move immediately to cancel the Boston Museum's educational tax exemption. That's one small change in tax law that would do wonders for the future of American civilization.

E. V. THAW

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